

UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES by MAJ Ronald Jacobs Jr., USA, 88 pages.

This study investigates the desirability of unifying the US Armed Forces into a joint military service. As the US reshapes and downsizes its armed forces for the future, the primary purpose continues to be support for joint operations and a modernization strategy that focuses on increased capabilities. The organization realignment, initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act of 1986, forced the armed forces to increase joint union and cooperation. However, an over-critical hypothesis suggests that Goldwater-Nichols failed to adequately establish newly defined roles, missions, functions, and failed to properly initiate a future organization for the armed forces in a joint environment.

The roles, missions, functions, and service organizations were used to highlight the similarities and differences of the US Armed Forces. The Canadian Forces were also used as a comparison to give prominence to the similarities and differences of an integrated and unified military service.

This study concludes that near-term desirability of unifying the armed forces is unlikely. However, long-term unification of similar functions may be desirable but that will require an intense evaluation for it to occur. This study promotes further research to possibly unify parts of the US Armed Forces.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Air Combat Command
ACOM	Atlantic Command
CDS	Chief of the Defense Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CFE	Conventional Forces Europe
C <sup>2</sup>	Command and Control
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CORM	Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
COS	Chief of Staff
CSA	Chief of Staff Army
CSAF	Chief of Staff Air Force
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONUS	Continental United States
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff
DoD	Department of Defense
DND	Department of National Defense
FORSCOM	Forces Command
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFC	Joint Force Commander
JOPES	Joint Operational Planning and Execution System
JOPP	Joint Operations Planning Process
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
LANTFLT	Atlantic Fleet
MARFORLANT	Marine Forces Atlantic
MOOTWA	Military Operations Other Than War
MRC	Major Regional Contingency
NCA	National Command Authority
NDHQ	National Defense Headquarters
NSC	National Security Council
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Task Force
STRAC	Strategic Army Corps
TAC	Tactical Air Command
UCP	Unified Command Plan
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USREDCOM	United States Readiness Command
USSOCOM	United States Operations Command
USSTRICOM	United States Strike Command
VCJCS	Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements with all Services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one regardless of Service.<sup>1</sup>

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Speech to  
the National War College, 1950

President Eisenhower's joint legislative comment is more important today than when he said it almost forty years ago. His statement highlights the importance of joint operations within the United States Armed Forces. Clearly, resources are insufficient to allow each of the services to maintain its current force structure, modernize, sustain combat readiness, and perform all required missions. Therefore, this nation must reduce duplication and redundancy to become more efficient. The Department of Defense (DoD) must do what corporations have done over the past decade; downsize and restructure for a changed world, focus on core competencies, and shed overhead that does not add value. Furthermore, to maximize the capabilities of a smaller force, remaining forces must share technological improvements across the board. By leveraging technology to reduce unnecessary and burdensome command layers, improving joint operations and encouraging much greater efficiency in joint logistics, DoD can modernize and still maintain a robust combat force structure. The changed security environment, combined with rapid advances in communications and weapons technology and mounting fiscal constraints, are

pushing the armed forces toward greater integration. In future conflicts, smaller forces will have to arrive in theater ready to fight as a joint team. For that reason, DoD must continue to work toward achieving coherent joint operations.

Today's military operations increasingly promote and emphasize joint and combined operations. Synchronized and coordinated air, land, and sea operations demand a level of training and procedures standardization that is absent from the military armed forces.<sup>2</sup> Joint tactics and procedures not in place and trained for will have to be developed in the midst of combat operations. Unfortunately, joint operations exist in an advanced technical environment where increased operational complexity, compressed factors of time and space, and rapidly changing situations of a nonlinear battlefield demand a new era of interservice cooperation and integration. Naval Doctrine Command analyst Dr. James Triten asserts that "In the chaos of combat, doctrine has a cohesive effect on our forces. It promotes mutually understood terminology, relationships, responsibilities, and processes, thus freeing the commander to focus on the central conduct of combat."<sup>3</sup> Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures cannot be adequately developed without some level of permanent and institutionalized joint interaction at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. When that joint interaction is solely limited to joint exercises that are independent of any permanent operational relationship, the result is imperfect and the effects short-lived.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, DoD must rely on a centralized control structure that destroys each service's parochial, self-centered, biased approach to evaluating roles, missions, functions, and structure of a future military force.

### Definitions

The terms *roles*, *missions*, and *functions* are sometimes used interchangeably but there are important distinctions between them. *Roles* are the broad and enduring purposes for which

the services and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) were established by Congress. In broadest terms, the *role* of the services is to organize, train, and equip forces: the Army for immediate and sustained combat pertaining to operations on land; the Navy for immediate and sustained combat pertaining to operations on and from the sea; the Air Force for immediate and sustained offensive and defensive air operations; the Marine Corps for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of land operations as may be essential to the performance of a naval campaign; and Special Operations Command for special operations, *functions* or *missions*. *Missions* are the tasks assigned by the president or secretary of defense to the unified and specified combatant commanders. The responsibilities of the combatant commanders are defined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), a document prepared by the joint staff, reviewed by the chairman, joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) and secretary of defense, and approved by the president. *Functions* are the “specific responsibilities” assigned by the president and secretary of defense to enable the services to fulfill their legally established *roles*. Therefore, the primary *function* of the services is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a *role*; to be employed by a combatant commander in the accomplishment of a *mission*.<sup>5</sup>

*Unity of effort* requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, nongovernmental organizations, and among nations in any alliance or coalition. Responsibilities for the strategic coordination of *unity of effort* are established in law and practiced by the president down to the combatant commanders.

The president, advised by the National Security Council (NSC), is responsible to the American people for national strategic *unity of effort*. The secretary of defense is responsible to the president for national military *unity of effort* for creating, supporting, and employing military



capabilities. *Unity of effort* among the armed forces is obtained from the authority of the president and the secretary of defense, by the strategic planning of the CJCS, and by laced service efforts of the armed forces. The secretary of defense exercises authority, direction, and control over the services through the secretaries of the military departments. The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for administration and support of their forces assigned to the combatant commanders. The National Command Authority (NCA), consisting of the president and the secretary of defense, or their authorized alternates, exercise authority over the armed forces through the combatant commanders for those forces assigned to the combatant commands and through the secretaries of the military departments and the service chiefs of those forces not assigned to the combatant commands. The CJCS functions under the authority, direction, and control of the NCA and transmits communications between the NCA and combatant commanders and overseas activities of combatant commanders as directed by the secretary of defense. The commanders of the combatant commands exercise command authority over assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA for the preparedness and performance of assigned missions.<sup>6</sup>

*Unified action* is a broad generic term referring to the wide scope of activities (including the synchronization of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of those commanders.<sup>7</sup> Within this general category of operations, subordinate commanders of forces conduct either single-service or joint operations to support the overall objective. *Unified action* integrates joint, single-service, special, and supporting operations; in conjunction with governmental and nongovernmental operations, into a *unity of effort* in the theater or joint operations area. *Unified action* within the military element of national power supports the national strategic *unity of effort* through close coordination with the other instruments of national power. The CJCS and all combatant commanders are in pivotal positions to ensure *unified*

*actions* are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the NCA. Combatant commanders should ensure that their *unified action* synchronizes joint operations and single-service operations in time, space, and purpose with the actions of the supporting combatant commands.<sup>8</sup>

*Unified action* of the armed forces begins with *unified direction*. For joint military operations, *unified direction* is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander (JFC), establishing command relationships, assigning and attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission.<sup>9</sup>

In today's environment, *jointness* appears to be synonymous with *joint* military operations. Joint Pub 1-02 defines *joint* as "... activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate."<sup>10</sup> The term *jointness* is mainly used in a holistic sense which covers all contexts, not just military operations. In defining *jointness*, one must look at *joint doctrine* which "offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way the services think and train for war."<sup>11</sup> *Joint doctrine* distills insights and wisdom gained from the armed forces' collective experience with warfare into basic principles that guide the employment of *joint* forces. *Joint warfare* is based on characteristics that allow *joint* forces to be more effective than single-service forces. This definition does not restate doctrine, but synthesizes various principles, concepts, and ideas with the aim of revealing the true meaning of *jointness*. First, based on unity of effort, *jointness* seeks to focus all the energy of the armed forces across the full range of military operations, throughout all levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical), in every environment (peace, crisis, and war), toward enhancing the effectiveness of military operations. While unity of effort centers on pure combat operations, it can also be applied to all other *joint* military activities, including those

conducted in peacetime. Second, *joint* forces provide commanders with multidimensional capabilities (land, sea, air, space, and special operations) that are more effective than single service forces by providing a wider range of operational and tactical options which pose multiple, complex problems for an enemy. Last, multiple service capabilities allow an innovative JFC to combine tactics, techniques, and procedures in asymmetrical as well as symmetrical ways synchronized to produce a total military impact greater than the sum of its parts.<sup>12</sup> Achieving this effect is the most important tenet of *jointness* since it allows JFCs to present few exploitable seams while taking advantage of enemy weak points. In addition, this synergism can be compounded as effects are synchronized and integrated throughout the theater of operations. Therefore, *jointness* can be defined as a focused effort by the armed forces toward a holistic process that seeks to enhance the effectiveness of all military operations by synchronizing their actions to produce synergistic effects between all *joint* activities at every level of war.

These terms are used in this manner throughout this document; however, this thesis will focus primarily on the *joint unification (unity of effort under unified action and direction)* of the *roles, missions, and functions* of the United States Armed Forces.

### Problem Statement

As the United States reshapes and downsizes its military armed forces for the future, the primary focus continues to be support for joint operations. This support includes a modernization strategy that focuses on increased capabilities. The organizational realignment, initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, forced the military armed forces to increase joint union and cooperation. Overall, Goldwater-Nichols enhanced the warfighting capabilities of the armed forces, but it also bounded the concept of jointness within the context of joint operations, particularly in terms of combat. The purpose of jointness should

be directed toward enhancing the effectiveness of operations. However, the lack of a theoretical foundation has resulted in a trial and error approach for addressing problems across the range of joint issues. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) Admiral William A. Owens stated that experimental approaches are the only practical means of determining how to improve jointness. Unfortunately this has led the joint staff, combatant commands, and services to derive coordinated joint processes (in doctrine, training, readiness, requirements, etc.) that are isolated or stovepiped from one another instead of thoroughly integrated.<sup>13</sup> While many factors affect jointness, these processes have the greatest impact, and their inefficient design suboptimizes the course of jointness. Not surprisingly, the VCJCS has said that he is unimpressed with the level of joint war-fighting, particular in terms of doctrine, training, requirements, and readiness.<sup>14</sup> An over-critical hypothesis suggests that Goldwater-Nichols failed to adequately establish newly defined roles, missions, functions, and structure for the military armed forces in a joint environment.

In his 1993 Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Services report, the former CJCS General Colin L. Powell recommended that some service functions should be consolidated to achieve the maximum effectiveness of the armed forces while other service functions should remain separate to also achieve the maximum effectiveness of the armed forces. The former CJCS upheld a recommendation that combined all Continental United States (CONUS) based forces into one joint command and that an executive agent be designated to streamline the services' infrastructure to enhance joint testing and training needs. He stated that "the time has come to merge these [CONUS-based forces] into a combatant command whose principle purpose will be to ensure the joint training and joint readiness of our response forces."<sup>15</sup> As the principal advocate of joint force integration, US Atlantic Command (ACOM) maximized the unique capabilities of its service components (Forces Command, Atlantic Fleet, Marine Forces Atlantic,

and Air Combat Command) by melding their combat elements into coherent joint warfighting teams prior to deployment. However, General Powell also advocated America having only one Air Force and the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps each having aviation arms essential to their warfighting roles. He concluded that he would not merge service capabilities or eliminate service functions for the sake of cosmetic change.<sup>16</sup> He supported the development of the “Base Force” which included all aspects of the active and reserve components and anticipated continued progress and improvement in the strategic environment. The end of the Cold War and the development of a new military strategy affected more than just the size and structure of the armed forces. It had a significant impact on the assignment of roles, missions, and functions among the armed forces and combatant commands. General Powell determined that the best way to save money and preserve the armed forces military capabilities was to continue the downsizing and eventually “reshape” the services for their new roles, missions and functions.<sup>17</sup>

Today the Nation’s warfighting strategy has changed, and DoD has reached a level of joint maturity that makes it possible to address the need for unified command over the military armed forces. As the military forward presence declines, it is more important than ever that the forces be trained to operate jointly; not just for occasional exercises, but as a new way of life. The new strategy demands forces that are highly skilled, rapidly deployable, and fully capable of operating effectively as a joint team immediately upon arrival. A joint headquarters would facilitate the identification, training, preparation, and rapid response of the military armed forces. The time has come to merge these forces into a command whose primary purpose will be to ensure joint training and joint readiness of this Nation’s forces. With force packages already accustomed to operating jointly, their deployment will be expedited. Combatant commanders will be able to focus more on theater operations and less on deployment and readiness concerns.<sup>18</sup> The strategic requirement to conduct two near simultaneous major regional contingencies

(MRCs) prescribes a necessity for the rapid integration and employment of joint forces.<sup>19</sup> It is critical to maintain the capability to employ military force on short notice without the benefit of extended preparation. The current force drawdown coupled with concurrent shifts in roles, missions, and functions substantiates the fact that logical, streamlining steps be taken to further integrate complementary joint war fighting capabilities. Concrete steps to integrate, standardize, and eliminate redundant tactical capabilities are essential to maximizing the United States defense capabilities.

Senator Sam Nunn, former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the reduction in the threat and the budget deficit crisis illustrates the opportunity and necessity for change toward the reduction of the duplicated roles and missions among the different services.<sup>20</sup> That compels DoD to adopt a new, more effective, organization because a new command configuration with a vested interest in achieving joint interoperability would give the necessary permanence to joint training issues that have been lacking in the past.<sup>21</sup> Joint cooperation and interoperability are essential in the downsized post-Desert Storm era, and a restructuring of the military armed forces is necessary to completely maximize joint integration and consolidation.

“The services are well past the point of being able to conduct sustained combat operations independently.”<sup>22</sup> Campaigns or even contingency operations on a single service basis are no longer feasible. The Army and the Marine Corps are dependent upon their sister services for air and sea transport and firepower. The Navy is dependent on Air Force defensive operations and firepower. The Air Force is the lead service for most air campaign operations, but it depends on significant Army air defense support and Naval logistical support. The inevitable dependence upon unique service capabilities makes the establishment of permanent and robust strategic, operational, and tactical relationships an absolute necessity.<sup>23</sup>

DoD uses various human, hardware, and software processes and systems to manage a myriad of joint processes: establish strategic direction, determine national policy, provide resources, and coordinate the proper military capability into effective military operations during peace and war. The main systems that provide this framework and constitute the process for effecting change are the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES), and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). These systems are closely related and will be involved in the realization of a unified joint military service.

### Hypothesis

This thesis will investigate the unification of the United States Armed Forces. The hypothesis for this thesis is: It is desirable to consolidate the military armed forces into a unified joint military service.

### Supporting Questions

The subject of this hypothesis centers on that tension between the traditions of service loyalty and the need to seek the often elusive synergy of joint combat power. There are five supporting questions to this hypothesis. First, what are the elements contributing to separate service identities, and how have those identities affected interservice relationships? This question will address the characteristics of the American military structure: its traditions, history, and organization.

Second, how does the present command structure affect and influence military joint operations? This question will address the effects of organization on joint military operations.

Third, how has the evolution of interservice relationships affected the command structure and the employment of combatant forces? This question will address the effects of history on joint military operations.

Fourth, how should responsibilities be divided between the joint military components and the services? This question will address interservice and intraservice relationships.

Finally, the fifth question, how should roles and functions be organized between the services, JCS and OSD to create a unified military service? This question will address the responsibilities of these offices toward joint organization and management.

### Significance of Study

This thesis will address a very sensitive and parochial subject. The American military organization embodies a tradition of service separatism, one that has been renewed and reinforced by patterns and paradigms of thought that stress the decisive effect of military force on the land, at sea, or in the air. Although these traditions, the natural result of historical circumstance and political choice, have served the nation well, they inevitably complicate the problem of joint operations in an age of increased global missions and new technological advances. Unity of command over joint forces and the expansion of the military missions are parallel efforts that have collided with service roles, functions, traditions, and prerogatives. Ultimately, the problems of jointness and the current organization are incapable of being solved without a redefinition of military professionalism that in its highest form places primary emphasis on the joint integration and interoperability of American combat power. However, no systematic effort has been made to identify the modifications needed to secure the success of a joint unified military service even though the formation of permanent joint operational relationships between the services is a necessity.<sup>24</sup>



Significant tactical and operational capabilities reside with each service and, more than likely, each service is not likely to volunteer to relinquish those capabilities. By their very nature, large organizations have a built-in resistance to change.<sup>25</sup> As the largest organization in the free world, in the midst of an ever changing environment, America's defense establishment has most problems of a large corporation forced to change during a downsizing period. At the core are the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps: institutions that find it difficult to adapt to changing conditions because of understandable attachments to the past. The very foundation of each service rests on instilling its members with pride in its missions, doctrine, customs and traditions. While these service distinctions are important in fostering a fighting spirit, cultivating them provokes tendencies to look inward and to isolate the institutions from outside challenges. General Gordon R. Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff, stressed the fact that DoD is in a revolutionary era where the services are challenged to assimilate the combined weight of a changing environment while forecasting their military force for that future environment. He emphasized the difficulty in shifting to a different perspective and that organizational and process changes are necessary to consummate the shift. He stated that it is a joint perspective that permits DoD to focus on important issues, such as the character of the armed forces and the manner in which they can work synergistically to increase the military capability. "In short, the system of systems is fundamentally a joint military entity. No single service can build it alone—only coordinated interactions of all the services can produce it."<sup>26</sup>

### Background

In 1787, the Constitution of the United States gave Congress the power and responsibilities "To declare War. . . To raise and support Armies. . . To provide and maintain a Navy." The president was made commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,

and the states were to exercise control over their militias until they were called to federal service.<sup>27</sup> The division of labor set forth by the Constitution of the United States resulted in the creation of precedents that would contribute much to the historic traditions of the Army and Navy. The services made a series of fundamental organizational choices that not only confirmed and advanced their separate identities but also revealed underlying differences in the way they viewed the essential military functions of command and staff. Those subtle but profound differences had an important effect on the way that each service confronted the problems associated with the increased complexity of warfare in their respective area of operations.

Congress envisioned the need for unified strategy so they created the War Department in 1789 and charged it with the responsibility for both Army and Navy functions. Then, in 1798 Congress created a separate Department of the Navy. By inaugurating these two agencies, Congress completed the first evolutionary step originally envisioned by Alexander Hamilton: an executive authority concentrated in a single cabinet officer position, responsible for each department, and directly responsible to the president as commander-in-chief. By this legislative enactment, the constitutional precept of civilian control had now been welded into parallel chains of command that linked the nation's military and naval forces to civilian authority. This was an organizational move of some significance that ensured "control of naval operations, directly under the president rather than through the War Department—thus providing some insurance against the adverse effects suffered by other nations when naval operations had been subordinated to land warfare and sea power objectives were ignored."<sup>28</sup> This was a position the Navy regarded as essential in pressing for the unique requirements of providing and maintaining naval forces. The creation of separate departments for War and Navy placed the president in his role as commander-in-chief and the sole government official responsible for service reconciliation and the protection of national security.

For the first century and a half the roles and functions of the Army and Navy were not subject to much debate. The Army's role was fighting on land. The Navy's and Marine's roles were fighting on, and from, the sea. This simple division of labor started to get complicated after World War I, when the services began to adapt the increasing combat potential of the airplane to its respective warfighting role.

The emergence of the airplane as a major military asset during World War I should have alerted the War Department of the need to adjust doctrines and organizations to changing realities. The continued development of airpower could not help but blur the traditional distinction between land and naval warfare, but the leaders reacted to this phenomenon in a traditionally bureaucratic manner: Each service developed its own airpower and protected it with artificial barriers to obscure costly duplications.

In 1942, the Joint Chiefs were established as a counterpart to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee. Although the wartime chiefs addressed certain priority issues, to a great extent World War II was fought along service lines. As the war drew to a close, an exhaustive debate ensued on how to organize the post war military. The Army favored a highly integrated system, but the Navy and others were strongly opposed because they feared the Army would dominate any established integrated system. The Air Force, then still a part of the Army, supported integration but was primarily interested in becoming a separate service. The primary supporters of unification were senior leaders in the Army Air Forces who felt that the Navy and Marine Corps had redundant capabilities that wasted critical assets and resources. Army Air Force leaders believed that a single department of defense, comprised of three services, would have the responsibility to the medium in which they operated—air, land, or sea. They also expected the system to enhance command and control, prevent wasted resources, and limit the overlap of capabilities. The public favored the unification because it would have reduced the national

defense budget. Nevertheless, the Navy and Marine Corps opposed unification because both would have lost their air assets, and the Marine Corps, possibly stripped of its ground combat units, would virtually cease to exist. Those not in favor of integration and unification were backed by stronger constituencies, including powerful alliances in Congress, than were the advocates of unification. Arguments that unification threatened civilian control over the military soon dominated the debate.<sup>29</sup>

In 1945, the defense organization consisted essentially of two separate and independent executive agencies: the War Department, which included the Army Air Force, headed by a Secretary of War, and the Navy Department, which included the Marine Corps, headed by the Secretary of the Navy. President Truman knew the importance of joint operations united with a streamlined organization so he urged Congress to combine the War and Navy Departments into a single department of National Defense. The objective of the reorganization included: a unified defense department headed by a single secretary administering a common budget; a JCS headed by a single chief of staff having control of the department budget and direct access to the president; a separate Air Force with control over all land-based aircraft, including those of the Navy; and the limitation of Congressional authorization to broaden organizational guidelines, with details being delegated to the Executive Branch.<sup>30</sup> This concept did not win acceptance with many government officials and after two years of studies, debate, and political maneuvering, the National Security Act of 1947 emerged with a compromised military establishment: a loose confederation of large, rigid service bureaucracies—now four instead of three—with a secretary powerless against them.<sup>31</sup>

The National Security Act of 1947 created the present-day DoD and established three military services subordinate to the secretary of defense. These were the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, each headed by its own

civilian secretary and each maintaining cabinet rank. In addition, the Act created the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency and further established a JCS system consisting of the Army Chief of Staff, the Naval Chief of Operations, and the Air Force Chief of Staff. A joint staff, supplied by the services and not to exceed one-hundred personnel, was also established. Although JCS existed, the operational chain of command ran from the president, through the secretary of defense, through the service secretary concerned, and then to the operational force involved.<sup>32</sup>

Amendments to the National Security Act in 1949 and 1953 strengthened the secretary's authority and expanded the size and responsibility of his staff but did little to alter the relative influence of the joint military system and services. By 1958 President Eisenhower was convinced that a more unified and streamlined chain of command was necessary to deploy combat forces. The days of separate land, sea, and air warfare were over, the president believed; therefore complete unification of all military planning, combat forces, and commands was essential. To this end, the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 was established as an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947.<sup>33</sup>

The new law authorized the president, acting through the secretary of defense and with advice of the JCS, to establish unified and specified commands, to assign missions to them, and to determine their force structure. This provision did not alter procedure or confer any new authorities, since under the 1947 law the JCS had taken these actions subject to the authority and direction of the president. The intent of the new law was to establish a clear line of command from the president through the secretary, with the JCS as the secretary's operational staff. The commanders of the unified and specified commands were made responsible to the president and secretary of defense for carrying out assigned missions and were delegated full operational command over forces assigned to them. Operational command gave the commanders of unified

and specified commands the authority to: direct the composition of subordinate forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, control overall assigned resources, and exercise full authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command was exercised through service component commanders and commanders of subordinate commands. However, assigned forces could only be transferred with presidential approval. Nevertheless, responsibility for administration of these forces remained with the respective military departments. Component commanders were authorized to communicate directly with their service chief on matters of administration, personnel, training, doctrine, logistics, communications, and other concerns of single service interest.<sup>34</sup>

By separate executive action, President Eisenhower, through the secretary of defense, discontinued the designation of military departments as executive agents for unified and specified commands. Henceforth, the chain of command ran from the president to the secretary of defense to the unified and specified commands. The JCS served as the defense secretary's staff and issued orders to the commands in the name of and under the authority of the secretary of defense.<sup>35</sup>

The National Security Act of 1947 was also amended to: strengthen the authority of the secretary of defense over the military departments; remove the service secretaries from the president's cabinet; create the position of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and make him a voting member; formally rename the military organization to the Department of Defense; strengthen the authority of the secretary of defense and the assistant secretaries of defense; remove the secretaries of the military departments from the operational chain of command; lengthen the term of the service chiefs from two to four years; and make the commandant of the Marine Corps an equal service chief with a vote.<sup>36</sup> The act also attempted to clarify and codify service roles and functions to provide a framework for program and budget decisions. After it

became law, service leaders met at Key West, Florida, and produced a broad outline for service functions. That outline guides the division of labor to this day. This amendment to National Security Act was the most significant piece of defense legislation in the nation's history to date; only the Constitution is a more fundamental source of authority on the structure by which the government seeks to ensure the nation's security.

In 1961, with troop strength reduced overseas, DoD's regionally oriented strategy depended on forces based in CONUS. General purpose forces available for fast overseas deployment consisted of: the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), containing the combat-ready units of the Continental Army Command; the composite air strike forces of Tactical Air Command (TAC); and Navy and Marine Corps units not assigned to unified commands. These forces were to be trained and operated as a joint entity so Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the JCS to develop a plan for integrating STRAC and TAC into a unified command.<sup>37</sup> The CJCS, the CSA, and the CSAF endorsed this idea, provided that the new command eventually included Navy and Marine Corps units. However, the CNO objected and stressed that the inherent flexibility of naval forces would be sacrificed if assigned to a command tailored to STRAC and TAC. He suggested that troop carrier and ground support aircraft be made organic to the Army or that a joint task force be organized that would train air-ground teams for augmentation of existing commands. Similarly, the CMC argued that the development of doctrine suited for joint Army-Air Force operations would suffice.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, Secretary of Defense McNamara ruled in favor of the proposed new command and the US Strike Command (USSTRICOM) was activated to provide unified control over CONUS based Army and Air Force units without regard to the restrictive limitation on forces. Initially, USSTRICOM was given no regional responsibilities but was assigned functional responsibilities to provide a general reserve for reinforcement of other unified commands, to train assigned forces, to develop joint doctrine, and to plan and execute

contingency operations as ordered. Later, USSTRICOM was given geographic planning responsibility for the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa south of the Sahara. In attempting to fulfill its functional responsibilities as a trainer and provider of forces, USSTRICOM frequently collided with the services' authority under Title X to organize, train, and equip forces.<sup>39</sup>

In 1971, USSTRICOM was replaced by US Readiness Command (USREDCOM), whose mission was what USSTRICOM's had been originally: functional responsibility for training and providing forces, with no geographic area of responsibility. USREDCOM experienced some of the same service resistance and reluctance as its predecessor in fulfilling its assigned training responsibilities. Eventually, USREDCOM was given additional functional responsibilities, including a requirement to plan for and provide joint task force headquarters and forces for contingency operations in areas not assigned to overseas CINCs. What began as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) eventually grew into a new combatant command, US Central Command (USCENTCOM). USREDCOM's missions and functions were reviewed in light of USCENTCOM's creation. USREDCOM was subsequently disestablished as the result of a combination of factors, not least of which was that DoD's strategy depended more on forward deployment and basing than on CONUS based forces to contain Soviet expansion.<sup>40</sup>

President Truman and President Eisenhower had recommended a much stronger joint system and their wisdom was exhibited by our conduct in the Vietnam War. Each service, instead of integrating efforts with others, considered Vietnam its own war and sought to carve out a large mission for itself. Each fought its own air war, agreeing only to limited measures for a coordinated effort. Body count and tons dropped became the measures of merit. Lack of integration persisted right through the 1975 evacuation of Siagon—where responsibility was split between two separate commands, one on land and one at sea.<sup>41</sup>



Their wisdom was also exhibited in operational failures such as: the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue attempt, the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, and the invasion of Grenada where the armed forces experienced difficulties communicating and coordinating movements.<sup>42</sup> These experiences and the perceptions of Vietnam began to raise questions as to the effectiveness of DoD and the mechanisms for planning and managing combat operations involving joint operations. The expressed concerns were: the quality of military advice to the president within the DoD, the need to redefine the role of the JCS, the need to strengthen unified and specified combatant commanders, and unnecessary layering and duplication of material acquisition and combat operations. The balance of influence within the defense establishment is oriented too much toward the individual services has been a constant theme of many past studies of defense organization. "A certain amount of service independence is healthy and desirable, but the balance now favors the parochial interests of the services too much and the larger needs of the Nation's defenses too little."<sup>43</sup> It is commonly accepted that one result of this imbalance is a constant bickering among the services. This is not the case. On the contrary, interactions among the services usually result in negotiated treaties which minimize controversy by avoiding challenges to service interests. Such a truce has its good points, but the lack of adequate questioning by military leaders results in gaps and unwarranted duplications in DoD's warfighting capabilities. A counterbalancing system is lacking that involves leaders who are not so obligated to their services and who can objectively examine strategy, roles, missions, functions, weapon systems, war planning, and other contentious issues that offset the influence of the individual services.<sup>44</sup> General David C. Jones, former CJCS, criticized the JCS support structure in the form of strong statements on the inadequacies of the JCS infrastructure and the roles and functions of the CJCS. General Jones' statements led directly to the passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Goldwater-Nichols

expanded interrelated CJCS functions which include: developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces, performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces, formulating policies for joint training, and establishing and maintaining a uniform system of evaluating preparedness.<sup>45</sup>

CJCS General Colin L. Powell used the powers given to him by Goldwater-Nichols to remove what he saw as barriers to jointness.<sup>46</sup> While the joint and unified system worked well overseas, CONUS forces still were service oriented. As the US presence overseas shrank, it became more important for CONUS-based forces to “be trained to operate jointly as a way of life and not just for occasional exercises.”<sup>47</sup> Growing acceptance of jointness opened the way toward unification. The term “specified” was retired and all forces now belonged to a joint team. While the services retained their Title X responsibilities, a single combatant command ensures the joint training and readiness of response forces. Unification of the Armed Forces, which began in 1947, was at last complete. CJCS General Colin L. Powell viewed US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) as the unified command because he watched USREDCOM falter seeing that the Navy was not part of it. Moreover, he favored an east coast headquarters to be sure that the Navy was involved this time.<sup>48</sup> The Army’s Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT), the Air Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Marine Corps’ Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) were recommended to be combined into one joint command by his 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces. Under this recommendation and approval, USACOM shifted from a predominately naval headquarters to a more balanced combatant command headquarters which is capable of tailoring its forces to reinforce DoD’s European presence under any contingency that may arise. USACOM is responsible for joint training, force packaging, and facilitating deployments during crises;

supporting United Nations peacekeeping operations; and providing assistance during national disasters.<sup>49</sup>

### Scope and Limitations

US Armed Forces roles and missions developed from a traditional, common sense understanding of the purpose of maintaining a military force. The unique political and cultural development of this country often dictated the need to embody these roles and missions in law and reflected democratic concern that the purpose of its military force be limited, not open ended. Limiting the purpose of the armed forces meant specifying the roles and missions of the different services. This greatly enhanced the ability of DoD officials to create the organizations, materiel, doctrines, and strategies needed to fulfill those functions.

Public law through Congressional legislation provides general roles and missions, while all other acts, especially DoD directives, provide specific ones. The general category of roles and missions has not fluctuated greatly because it requires legislation to amend them, and they are sufficiently broad in scope that they do not require redefinition. The specific roles and missions undergo periodic language adjustments and frequently change altogether because of interservice debate and the advancement of new technologies, doctrine, and strategy formulation. In sum, the lack of specific legislation in these areas has greatly enhanced flexibility in the evolution and development of specific roles and missions.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, joint operations have resulted in an ever sharper delineation of the specific roles and missions of the armed forces. Joint operations have forced the services to enunciate specific roles and missions with the idea of periodic reevaluation.

Goldwater-Nichols had direct and indirect effects on the military departments. The latter included changes which did not directly affect the services but increased the authority and responsibilities of the organizations above them. The roles and responsibilities of the secretary of

defense, the CJCS, and the combatant commanders were strengthened. Although Goldwater-Nichols expanded and strengthened the roles and functions of the CJCS, Congress failed to provide the necessary resources in four crucial areas. First, Goldwater-Nichols charged the CJCS with developing joint doctrine, but the JCS staff was undermanned and underfunded.<sup>51</sup> Consequently, joint doctrinal development was passed to the services, although most individual services were not fully equipped with the resources needed to publish joint doctrine. Second, the CJCS is also responsible for assessing service capabilities; however, there is no rigorous evaluation plan on the horizon. Third, joint training posed another dilemma: the services have the responsibility to train forces for joint operations, but no one has the responsibility for training the combatant commanders and their staffs to use those joint forces. Lastly, the JCS was tasked to evaluate the armed forces joint readiness under a uniform system which, at the present time, does not exist.<sup>52</sup>

In its direct effects, Goldwater-Nichols made several changes to military departments which had mixed results. The act attempted to reduce duplication between service secretariats and service staffs by separating civilian and military functions and by assigning certain "sole responsibilities" to the secretary of defense. The potential integration of service secretaries and staffs was the underlying issue. However, Congress was split: the House favored integration while the Senate was opposed it. Finally they determined that service secretariats and staffs should be separately organized but expressed continuing concern over this duplication which survived in the compromise language.<sup>53</sup>

Structural tensions in military department headquarters remain and are subject to even more scrutiny today with pressure to downsize staffs and reduce duplication. The Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) found that having two staffs in the same headquarters, three in the case of the Department of the Navy, impedes integration of effort

and causes friction in the headquarters as well as at higher and lower echelons. The commission concluded: "Military department secretaries and chiefs would be better served by a single staff of experienced civilians and uniformed officers."<sup>54</sup> No significant progress has been made on this highly contentious proposal. This issue is further burdened by the need for statutory relief in certain areas before closer integration and consolidation can be attained. In sum, Goldwater-Nichols was less concerned with reforming military departments than strengthening joint components.

Total military strength is rooted in unique service attributes. DoD requires an Army to win wars with mechanized infantry, heavy armor forces, and air defense units; Air Force bombers for strategic missions, fighters for escort, and air lifters for transport; a Navy and Marine Corps to protect vital ocean life lines, respond to crises, bring power to an adversary's doorstep, and enable the introduction of heavy forces. Service unique attributes do not necessarily lead to battlefield compartmentalization along lines of specialization. War is, by definition, chaotic and nonlinear, and best handled in a seamless, joint command and control architecture with the services working together. Proposals that ignore these battlefield truths inhibit effective joint warfare operations.<sup>55</sup>

With respect to missions of the future, it appears that conflicts among major powers will be the exception.<sup>56</sup> Threats exist along two vastly different segments of the conflict spectrum: at the low end with military operations other than war (MOOTW), and at the high end beyond conventional war through the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Recent MOOTW missions which have involved joint forces—Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Liberia—contrasted sharply with the focus of the Cold War era and the regional conflict in the Gulf. Moreover, these missions have been the normal operations of the armed forces except for the anomaly of the Cold War.<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, these missions must be conducted swiftly and

efficiently, with a higher premium on the integration of service capabilities and joint readiness. The need to be prepared for these vastly contrasting missions poses significant challenges for joint operations. These challenges consist of developing competencies for new limited missions while also enhancing joint warfighting; frightening tasks given the likelihood of continuing resource constraints. Historical fact verifies the truth that the US Armed Forces have met this test in the past, but a review of the structure, organization, equipment, training, and personnel, as well as the roles and functions of the services, indicates that all of these were successfully adapted to the prevailing circumstances in a dynamic and radical way. When the optimal organizational changes are brought about with the technical revolution, a further quantum leap in combat power will result. Although the precedent and the process for change exist, military and civilian leaders may be more capable of effecting the required changes. Senator Sam Nunn has repeatedly stunned the Pentagon by calling for fundamental restructuring of roles and missions of the armed forces. He has identified at least ten areas that are fraught with redundancy and duplication of effort. This situation requires a visiting surgeon like Senator Nunn because the uniformed senior leadership of the departments cannot visualize or readily alter their own self-images and role models to accommodate a new paradigm.<sup>58</sup>

### Summary

The forces of the Army, Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Force are designed and equipped to deter conflicts through a visible and forthright capability to resist aggression against any country or vital United States interests. Inherent in these forces is the capability to conduct joint military operations at any required level of conflict, while providing credible nuclear deterrence, and to still offer escalation options to the National Command Authority.

Meaningful reform will not be easy. Progress toward increased jointness is pursued informally at all officer levels. However, despite Goldwater-Nichols, service parochialism remains entrenched at junior and senior officer levels.<sup>59</sup> John Steinbeck wrote, “It is the nature of man as he grows older to protest against change, particularly change for the better.”<sup>60</sup> The services are reluctant to change, especially when it involves combining roles and responsibilities of the armed forces. Civilian and military leaders within each military department must do their part to enhance jointness in ways perceived to be constructive and oriented toward problem solving. The system will not reform itself without institutional incentives. General John Shalikashvili, the CJCS, highlighted this point in a testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 1994:

We in the Armed Forces are...going to have to search for innovative ways to make our force more efficient, better trained, and more effective. We cannot and will not allow any sacred cows or gold watches to get in our way...or block our imagination.<sup>61</sup>

Goldwater-Nichols, as currently structured, is only a partial stimulus that does not and cannot achieve the overall goal of jointness. The services need to stop regarding each other with uncertainty and focus on coordinated efforts. The luxury of a prolonged military buildup for an air and ground campaign that existed in the Persian Gulf will not likely be replicated in future conflicts. Anticipating this transition with targeted training and planning will do much to ensure peak operational and tactical flexibility during actual joint combat operations. After all, reform instituted from within the military will be more palatable than change mandated from without.<sup>62</sup>

### Literature Review

This section reviews the sources of data available concerning the desirability of unifying the military armed forces into a single joint military service. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, joint military operations have been routine events, but the idea of a joint unified military

service was first looked at in the post-World War II era. However, due to the extremely long lineage of the armed forces, the scope of this research encompasses material from 1788 to the present. Pre-1986 material provides background information on the desirability of unifying the armed forces and material from 1986 to the present represents the current state of affairs of the armed forces and the eagerness of unification.

There are literally thousands of military periodicals that address joint operations in one aspect or another and most of the authors are military and government employees. Few sources outside the DoD actually address the issue of a unified military service. The data collected and analyzed for this paper is divided into two categories: government and DoD documents, military periodicals, and joint publications.

#### Government and DOD Documents

*The Constitution of the United States* established a basic document for the roles and missions of the armed forces by providing the necessary foundation for the military establishment. All subsequent legislation or executive orders which detailed specific roles and missions for the armed forces were built on this framework. This document also divided the military authority between two branches: the legislative branch and the executive branch. The legislative branch, (Congress) specifies roles and missions and the executive branch, (the president) operates as the CINC.<sup>63</sup>

*The National Security Act of 1947* was the primary document of the post-World War II organization for the national security framework of the US government. The act was a direct result of the lessons learned during the war and the almost universal conviction of the need for a consolidated military establishment during peacetime. The experience with the JCS, unified commands, and joint operations of the Army Air Force and Navy during the war led Congress,



with strong support from President Harry S. Truman, to a unified concept of national security. The result of this act provided for a "National Military Establishment" with a secretary of defense and three executive military departments: the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. In practice, the new system did not immediately centralize or unify the organization, but rather federated it much as the JCS system had been during the war. It would take successive amendments to further strengthen and centralize the defense establishment. The act by itself failed to clarify the specific roles and missions of the three services. This was intentional, for the services successfully argued against enshrining specific roles and missions in law in order to retain flexibility.<sup>64</sup>

*Executive Order 9877* was closely tied to the negotiations leading up to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. This joint document was prepared on service functions for possible use by Congress and the president in developing unification legislation. Signed by Truman the same day he signed the National Security Act into law, this executive order specified common missions of the armed forces and specific functions of each of the services. Meant to coincide with the exact wording of the National Security Act, there were enough differences between the two documents that generated controversy and friction among the services.<sup>65</sup>

*The Key West Agreement* solved the differences between the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 9877 regarding roles and missions assigned to the armed forces. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and the JCS secluded themselves at Key West, Florida, in March 1948 to work out agreeable positions on specific roles and missions. The result was a draft roles and missions statement entitled Functions of the Armed Forces and JCS. After further revision, Forrestal submitted this for approval to President Truman along with a recommendation to revoke Executive Order 9877. Truman revoked the executive order and returned the document to Forrestal to implement under his authority. This function document described broad

delineations and more specific functions in greater detail than the executive order. Section II of the document began with what it called Common Functions of the Armed Forces. This section was similar to what the executive order had called Common Missions, and in fact the first three general functions were exactly the same as the first three missions in the executive order. This is highlighted to illustrate the shifting notion of what were missions and what were functions. It should also be noted that although this document is often cited as a roles and missions statement, there is no direct mention of either term. However, it does define functions as “responsibilities, missions, and tasks.” Also, in a departure from previous documents but in regards to fostering joint efforts, the document listed “collateral functions” for each of the services. This innovative feature instructed each service to use forces trained in their primary function to be employed to support and supplement the other services in carrying out their primary functions. This would be done where and whenever the participation would result in increased effectiveness and the accomplishment of overall objectives.<sup>66</sup>

*DoD Directive 5100.1* came as a result of the experiences of the Korean War and the new Eisenhower administration’s reorganization of the defense department; it reflected a refinement and further delineation of the functions of the armed forces. The operational chain of command now ran from the president through the secretary of defense through the service secretary and through the unified commander. One service would be named by the secretary of defense as executive agent for the unified command and no DOD function could be performed “independent of the direction, authority, and control” of the secretary of defense. The net result was that DoD had become more centralized with even greater civilian control of the military. This document remains the key document on specifying the basic functions of the armed forces.<sup>67</sup>

*The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* sought to correct the problems with the joint employment of the military services in the 1970s and 1980s.

The Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, headed by David Packard, forcefully recommended many changes that Congress adopted with this legislation. Congress concluded that the employment of military forces was strictly a joint matter that the individual services should not dominate. The services should confine their efforts to organizing, training, and equipping their forces for the joint commands. Many Congress officials thought that single service interests were blocking and frustrating the unity of command in joint operations. The act strengthened civilian authority, the operational chain of command, and the JCS system. It also defined functions of the armed forces as roles and missions. The intent of Congress was to ensure that OSD and CJCS played a role in the division of service functions. The act by itself did not address any of the service functions, but it implied a recognition that service functions played a key role in the unified and specified commands.<sup>68</sup>

*The CJCS Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* was required by Goldwater-Nichols “to periodically recommend such changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and missions) as the CJCS considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces.” This report is a comprehensive summary of a process of internal review and self-appraisal to fix problems in the roles and missions of the armed forces to ensure that a new strategy and force structure were aligned as effectively as possible. The objective of this document was to maintain and enhance the combat readiness of the armed forces in a downsizing period.<sup>69</sup>

*The Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* sights tremendous and significant changes that must be made in order to develop a DoD capable of handling the challenges of an uncertain and constantly changing security environment. The report found that the traditional approaches to roles and missions are no longer appropriate. The

question is no longer “who does what,” but how are the right set of capabilities identified, developed, and fielded to meet the needs of the unified commanders.<sup>70</sup>

#### Military Periodicals and Joint Publications

The military periodicals and joint publications used to investigate the possibility of unifying the armed forces are numerous. They contain the many different principles of joint operations. To name them all would be a tremendous task by itself. However, two joint publications that were very important to this research were *Joint Pub 1* and *Joint Pub 0-2*.

*Joint Pub 1* guides the joint action of the armed forces by presenting concepts that mold the armed forces into the most effective fighting force. This publication emphasizes the idea that joint operations offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and joint doctrine fundamentally shapes the way the services prepare and train for war. The enduring theme of this publication is “joint warfare is team warfare.”<sup>71</sup>

*Joint Pub 0-2* sets forth doctrine, principles, and policy to govern the joint activities and performance of the armed forces. It designates the authorized command relationships and the authority military commanders can utilize; provides doctrine, principles and policy for the exercise of that authority; provides doctrine, principles, and policy for organizing joint forces; and prescribes policy for selected joint activities. In sum, this publication links joint doctrine to the national security strategy and the national military strategy. It sets forth the concepts, relationships, and processes necessary for unified action for joint operations. It outlines the nature of joint operations and the comprehensive exercise of command authority within joint operations.<sup>72</sup>

The above assessment is based on an examination of the literature reviewed to date. Other pertinent works collected for research are included in the bibliography.

### Research Design

The research design for this thesis will require three phases. Phases will operate in succession as well as be interactive to support the refinement of questions, limitations, delimitations, assumptions, conclusions, and recommendations. Phase one will survey the existing data for historical and background information pertaining to the armed forces unification. Phase two will evaluate the defense organization, the alignment of roles and missions, and a comparative analysis of the Canadian unified force structure. This phase will also seek to synthesize the conclusive solution to the main and subordinate questions. Phase three will establish the conclusion and pursue the development of recommendations. Criteria used to test the hypothesis will maintain the objectives of the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy which includes the armed forces roles and functions during warfare operations: the defeat, destruction, or deterrence of the opposing armed forces with the maximum effective use of US resources.

The purpose of the research design is to answer the supporting questions, and ultimately, the primary research hypothesis. Chapter two will provide the analysis needed to answer the supporting questions. Chapter three will validate or invalidate the hypothesis based on the answers to the supporting questions.

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<sup>1</sup>Richard L. West, Lieutenant General, United States Army (Retired), *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Its Impact on the Army* (Arlington, AUSA, 1988), 3.

<sup>2</sup>John M. Quigley, Commander, United States Navy, "Creating Joint Warfighters," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 121 (September 1995): 62.

<sup>3</sup>James J. Tritten, "What is This Doctrine Stuff?," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 121 (January 1995): 78.

<sup>4</sup>John M. Quigley, Commander, United States Navy, "Creating Joint Warfighters," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 121 (September 1995): 63.

<sup>5</sup>Colin L. Powell, General, United States Army, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington: National Defense University Press, February 1993), I-1, I-2, I-3.

<sup>6</sup>*Unified Action Armed Forces* (Washington: U.S. Government, February 1995), I-3.

<sup>7</sup>*Unified Action Armed Forces* (Washington: U.S. Government, February 1995), I-4.

<sup>8</sup>*Unified Action Armed Forces* (Washington: U.S. Government, February 1995), I-5.

<sup>9</sup>*Unified Action Armed Forces* (Washington: U.S. Government, February 1995), I-5.

<sup>10</sup>*Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: U.S. Government, March 1994), 218.

<sup>11</sup>*Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: U.S. Government, March 1994), 219.

<sup>12</sup>Philip D. Shutler, "Thinking About Warfare," *Marine Corps Gazette* (November 1987).

<sup>13</sup>William A. Owens, Admiral, United States Navy, "Living Jointness," *Joint Force Quarterly* 3 (Winter 1993-94): 14.

<sup>14</sup>William A. Owens and James R. Blaker, "Overseeing Cross-Service Trade Offs," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 37.

<sup>15</sup>Colin L. Powell, General, United States Army, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC : National Defense University Press, February 1993), xxii, xxiii.

<sup>16</sup>Colin L. Powell, General, United States Army, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC : National Defense University Press, February 1993), III-4.

<sup>17</sup>Colin L. Powell, General, United States Army, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC : National Defense University Press, February 1993), II-2.

<sup>18</sup>Colin L. Powell, General, United States Army, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC : National Defense University Press, February 1993), III-4.

<sup>19</sup>John M. Quigley, Commander, United States Navy, "Creating Joint Warfighters," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 121 (September 1995): 63.

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## CHAPTER 2

### ANALYSIS

We should not go into the future with just a smaller version of our Cold War forces. We must prepare for a future with a fresh look at the roles and missions that characterized the past forty years. We must reshape, reconfigure, and modernize our overall forces; not just make them small. We must find the best way to provide a fighting force in the future that is not bound by the constraints of the roles and missions outlined in 1948.<sup>1</sup>

Senator Sam Nunn, 1992

Senator Nunn and his associates went beyond asking for a review of the chronic roles, missions, functions, problems of overlap, duplication, and parochialism in the services. They called for a complete review of DoD's post-cold war direction and the means to realize that direction. This review reflected congressional concern with the pace and breadth of DoD's reductions in costs and other adjustments to the new security environment. "We do not think through defense problems adequately, and we are getting less capability than we should from our defense budgets. There is reason to believe that, faced with a contingency requiring a major joint operation, our performance would be below the level we should expect or need."<sup>2</sup> General David C. Jones reflected his attempts to initiate an internal reorganization of the joint system. Change was necessary to increase DoD's efforts to ensure the effectiveness of joint operations in the context of traditional military functions. However, it is more important to extend this concept further into DoD by focusing management, decision-making processes and support structures more directly on effective unified military operations. Both Senator Nunn's and General Jones'

statements paralleled the primary goal of DoD: achieving effective military operations; and the unification of all joint military capabilities is the key to reaching that goal. America has been moving in that direction since World War II and the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act has enhanced the warfighting capabilities of the armed forces and has ushered in a "bright new era" of interservice cooperation and integration that culminated in the unparalleled successes of Operation DESERT STORM in 1991.

### Overall Defense Perspective

Public Law 99-433, known as the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, was an ambitious effort to correct many real and perceived problems in areas associated with OSD and the JCS, as well as the operational commands and the military departments. No area or activity was too small or insignificant for treatment. The act also reflected the frustrations of Congress with dealing with DoD over the years.

The first page of the act states the policy which guided the authors:

In enacting this Act, it is the intent of Congress, consistent with the congressional declaration of policy in section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401) –

1. To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
2. To improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
3. To place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
4. To ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
5. To increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
6. To provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
7. To improve joint officer management policies; and
8. Otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.<sup>3</sup>

The provisions of this act seem to fulfill its stated charter. The CJCS is now the principal advisor to the NCA, and a corporate body remains with the members of the JCS. The CJCS is urged to consult with them and the operational commanders while formulating advice to the president and secretary of defense. There is now a VCJCS who is the second ranking military officer in the defense establishment. The operational unified and specified commanders have more authority over subordinate forces and are more involved in the areas of resourcing and material acquisition. The joint staff essentially works for the CJCS as opposed to the corporate body and the drafters of the act were compelled to prohibit the joint staff from operating as an Armed Forces General Staff. The joint staff will not have "executive authority," thereby excluding their exercising directive or command authority.<sup>4</sup>

There are repeated directions to relate the realities and constraints of funding more closely with strategy and planning. The emphasis is on the CJCS to highlight strategy resourced mismatches as well as readiness deficiencies based on a reporting system developed by the CJCS and the operational commanders. The emphasis is on jointness to include a major effort to develop a personnel system which produces leaders and staff officers who are qualified in joint matters as defined by Congress. This is a major incursion into how the services traditionally have managed their officer corps, but unfortunately, some of the provisions cannot be followed without major changes in career development patterns.<sup>5</sup>

In sum, the authority and responsibility of the CJCS, the operational commanders, and the civilian hierarchy have been increased. These changes have been made at the expense of the service chiefs and the congressional unhappiness with the acquisition efforts of the services is apparent in the language of the act. Lastly, the lack of credibility in Congress with the joint operational planning system motivated the attempts of Congress to make it more realistic and in tune with budget constraints and imperatives.

## Organization and Management

DoD is a large, highly complex organization that is not easy to compare to other executive departments or private enterprises. It is a product of history, technology, and legislation. The effectiveness of its components is often seemingly intertwined with the success or failure of individuals who lead them and vice versa. Nevertheless, the purpose and intent behind defense organization can be discerned in law and regulation, and its development traced over the course of the last five decades. The Congressional intent for creating a new military establishment are outlined in a "Declaration of Policy" in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 401):

In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide. . . a Department of Defense, including the three military departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or specified combatant commands and a clear and direct line of command to such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense, and particularly in the field of research and engineering by vesting its overall direction and control in the Secretary of Defense; to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration in the Department of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic direction of combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of staff over the Armed Forces nor an overall Armed Forces general staff.<sup>6</sup>

The "Declaration of Policy" does not reflect everything that has been done to shape organization, though changes such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act were presented as "consistent with" and adding emphasis to its basic purpose. The declaration contains broad objectives for the establishment of DoD such as: *unified direction* and *effective, efficient, and economical administration*; and at least three prohibitions: merging the services, creating a single *chief of staff*, or creating a *general staff*. It also reveals bureaucratic tensions that existed in 1947 and also

later between central and decentralized authority. Overall, however, the rambling nature of this declaration needs support by organizational structures and relationships established in law and regulation to clarify congressional intent.<sup>7</sup>

Title 10 organizes DOD into ten basic components:

OSD	Department of the Army
JCS	Department of the Navy
Joint Staff	Department of the Air Force
Defense Agencies	Unified/Specified Commands
DOD Field Activities	Agencies Designated by Law

Yet a careful reading of the law and DOD Directive 5100.1 shows that these components are divided into three major elements:

1. The roles and functions related to the unified authority, direction, and control of the DoD are vested in the secretary of defense, assisted by his staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the defense agencies and field activities which report to them. Law and regulation are particularly clear in the ultimate authority and responsibility of the secretary of defense. He is charged with providing DoD components with guidance on national security objectives and policies for preparing programs and budgets, as well as policy guidance for the CJCS concerning contingency planning. The secretary of defense is in the chain of command and is responsible for the effective, efficient, and economical administration (including the assignment of defense agencies and field activities to his staff or the CJCS); and all components, including military departments, are subject to his authority, direction, and control.<sup>8</sup>

2. The roles and functions of joint military advice, strategic planning, and the integration and direction of combatant forces are vested in the JCS (headed by the CJCS), the joint staff, and

the unified and specified combatant commands. CJCS responsibility for joint military components is very clear. He presides over JCS, controls the joint staff, and is assigned no less than fifty-two principle functions under DoD Directive 5100.1 which are independent of the corporate responsibility of the JCS to provide military advice. At the direction of the secretary of defense (as authorized in law), CJCS functions within the chain of command, serves as spokesman for the combatant commanders, and is responsible for their oversight. While he has no command authority, the CJCS may aptly be described as the routine manager of the combatant commanders as well as the secretary of defense's "first phone call" on issues involving the combatant commands.<sup>9</sup>

3. The roles and functions of organizing, training, and equipping forces are the responsibility of the military departments (Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force). The military departments are separately organized and administered under their respective secretaries, who are in the chain of command for purposes other than the operational direction of forces. Subject to authority, direction, and control of the secretary of defense, the common functions of these departments fall into four groups. *Organizing* includes recruitment, mobilization, and demobilization. *Training* includes doctrine, procedures, tactics and techniques, and support for joint training. *Equipping* includes research and development, supply, maintenance, and "construction, outfitting, and repair of equipment." The fourth function is general *administration* of these activities including servicing forces; developing policies, programs, and budgets; carrying out construction, maintenance and repair of buildings; and managing real property. Overall, through these functions, the role of each department is to prepare and maintain ready, mutually supporting forces (including reserves) for assignment to combatant commands.<sup>10</sup>

In sum, the purposes of defense organization as outlined in law and regulation, as well as roles and functions of many DoD components, are best understood under three major elements:



unified direction, authority and control; joint military advice and planning as well as integrated deployment; and organization, training, and equipping administered generally on the basis of land, sea, and air forces.

While a good deal of congressional interest has focused on duplication of the services, higher level issues among three primary elements; OSD, joint military components, and military departments are also important. Most DoD components and activities have roots in them, and basic issues of defense organization and management involve appropriately balancing them and the way that roles and functions intersect or overlap. Moreover, organizational and bureaucratic history can best be understood in the context of how these elements developed.

#### Organizational Trends

What are the elements contributing to separate service identities, and how have those identities affected interservice relationships? Two significant trends in defense organization have emerged since 1947: the centralization of authority within OSD and the strengthening of structures responsible for joint advice, planning, and operations. Successive amendments to the National Security Act that increased the authority of the secretary of defense, the CJCS, and the CINCs reflect these trends. In general, these changes have had a common goal of improving joint operations within DoD and reducing the relative service independence that the military departments have enjoyed for almost 200 years. These trends have produced three major centers of power which account for nearly all DoD components: unified authority, direction, and control from OSD; joint military advice, planning, and integrated employment from the CJCS and other joint structures; and organizing, training, and equipping administered by three military departments clustered around land, sea, and air forces. Within this triangle, the influence of OSD and the joint structures has prevailed while that of the departments has declined.<sup>11</sup>

Between 1947 and 1958, several fundamental changes in defense organization affected the military departments. In general, these changes reduced the role of the service secretaries as independent civilian policymakers and created patterns of interaction whereby service staffs sometimes worked directly with OSD, thus bypassing service secretariats. Congruently, changes in the chain of command and the assignment of forces to combatant commands also reduced the authority of the service chiefs, although their influence in joint matters remained strong. These losses of authority changed working relationships within DoD in many ways: sometimes causing friction between civilian and military leaders in the services and sometimes bringing them closer together to protect the remnants of service autonomy.<sup>12</sup>

Outside commissions and reports provided conflicting opinions of the military departments. The 1960 Symington Committee recommended the strong centralization of management under OSD and the elimination of service secretaries and their staffs. The 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel advised decentralization and a reduction in the duplication of effort among OSD, service secretaries, and service staffs. The 1978 Ignatius Report sought a stronger role for service secretaries, recommending their greater use in defense operations and tasks. It also promoted further reduction of the duplication in service headquarters and "common access" by service secretaries and chiefs to analytical and oversight functions.<sup>13</sup> Though these recommendations produced some minor adjustments in responsibilities within the military departments after 1958, the next major crossroad for statutory change came with Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.<sup>14</sup>

The Goldwater-Nichols Act rightly focused on joint military structures: OSD, JCS, the joint staff, and the unified commands; where significant organizational deficiencies had existed for more than four decades. However, some assessments revealed weaknesses on the administrative side of DoD which have been magnified by post-cold war security challenges.

Goldwater-Nichols also left some unfinished business in its treatment of the military departments. The basic role of service secretaries is a perennial issue, and missions and functions across the military departments need to be addressed. Among the corners of the organizational triangle, changes since Goldwater-Nichols have continued the erosion of service influence. For example, the equipping function has evolved in a way that leaves the military departments functioning as initiators, managers, and administrators of procurement programs whose content is increasingly seen from a joint perspective and is decided in greater detail by OSD.<sup>15</sup>

### Organizational History

How does the present command structure affect and influence military joint operations? The period from 1947 to 1960 was formative as the legitimacy of centralized control slowly increased. The management and oversight responsibilities of the secretary of defense developed in functional organizations beginning with the comptroller and expanding to the general counsel, research and development committee, logistics services, personnel services, health services, etc.. The strengthening of joint military perspectives went beyond coordination among the JCS in the post-war theaters of occupation to a new system of unified and specified combatant commands. Statutory responsibilities for operational control of forces shifted from military departments and service secretaries to JCS, combatant commanders and the secretary of defense. This period can be characterized as a struggle between central authorities and long-standing (previously autonomous) military departments.<sup>16</sup>

The authority that the secretary of defense acquired in this formative period was asserted throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Management processes (planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition) shifted broad resource allocation responsibilities to OSD, and growth of defense agencies and field activities was initiated to promote efficiency in areas of common

supply and support. Both of these trends further eroded the influence of the military departments. As a result of these trends and the Vietnam War, familiar interservice rivalries were less prominent than friction with OSD over the importance and quality of joint advice as well as the role of civilians in operational planning. Overall this was an era of civil-military competition.<sup>17</sup>

The 1970s and 1980s produced progressive rebuilding of bridges between OSD and JCS in matters of strategy, policy, and resource allocation. It also saw growing joint influence in DoD management processes. The authority of the secretary of defense over DoD activities was reinforced, as was OSD staff control over defense agencies. The role of the CJCS was strengthened by the assignment of numerous duties and responsibilities independent of the corporate JCS, and combatant commanders gained further control over their component forces. The influence of the military departments continued to decline in comparison to OSD and joint military components, but the responsibilities of civilian appointees in service headquarters were broadened. In sum, those organizations at the highest levels (OSD, CJCS, and combatant commanders) were substantially strengthened during this period.<sup>18</sup>

The review conducted by the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces shares similarities with earlier debates. Interservice issues seem much the same, for example: how to separate Air Force and Army responsibilities for theater aerospace defense and ground support; how to distinguish between Army and Marine Corps contingency or expeditionary responsibilities; and how to properly allocate airpower responsibilities across the services. Each issue involves the assignment of responsibilities and forces among the military departments. As in 1948, this review occurs in a period of strategic reassessment and reductions in spending. However, the context of these and other issues has been greatly changed by history and operational experience, technology, and organizational developments.<sup>19</sup>

The late 1980s and 1990s saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and an end to the Cold War. As the world situation changed, the military undertook a thorough analysis of the force structure needed to accomplish a new military strategy. The Bottom-Up Review was an effort to define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities in the post-cold war world. The review was a collaborative effort of OSD, the JCS, unified and specified commands, services and other DoD components. Four broad classes of potential military operations were used in the Bottom-Up Review to evaluate the adequacy of future force structure alternatives: major regional conflicts; smaller-scale conflicts requiring peace enforcement operations; overseas presence; and deterrence of attacks with weapons of mass destruction.<sup>20</sup>

These types of operations were used to analyze the building blocks of the required forces known as the Base Force. The Base Force is a future force concept which anticipates continued progress and improvement in the strategic environment. It is a dynamic force which can respond to further favorable change while providing for the optimum mix of forces necessary to execute the National Military Strategy. The new military strategy requires units to retain a high state of readiness, in order to respond to the dynamic challenges of the new world order, including rapid response to crises, natural disasters, and peace keeping operations. It takes into consideration each service's strengths and weaknesses and provides the greatest return from available resources.<sup>21</sup>

The Army began to re-examine the strategic environment in the fall of 1987. The incoming chief of staff of the Army concluded that the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks had long-term implications on the US Army's presence in Europe. After considerable internal debate and discussion, the Army leadership concluded that the best course of action (in such a period of uncertainty) was to retain as much of its force structure as possible. This

position drove the Army's analysis and responses to OSD through the programming and budgeting phases. During these two phases the Army traded off its modernization and acquisition programs in order to sustain its force structure. Unfortunately, in the face of external events: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the further decline of the Warsaw Pact threat, and reduced fiscal guidance, the Army found that it could no longer analytically support its force structure level. Its early analyses were derived from a quantitative computation of requirements. These requirements were based on such factors as attrition, consumption rates, threat, operational tempo, costs, and acceptable risks. As uncertainty and risk changed, analysis could no longer justify a large active force structure, and the Army was finally externally directed to bring its force structure into alignment with the Base Force numbers.<sup>22</sup>

Similar to the Army, the Navy was also hesitant to accept a radical change in the threat environment. In the early phases of the Base Force analysis, the Navy in several formal responses to OSD indicated that a sharp reduction in resource levels could inhibit the Service's ability to wage a general war. However, the Navy recognized that, given the new strategic realities, there would be a force structure adjustment. The Navy accepted the concept of the Base Force and resolved most of its conflicts by compromising manpower, in both the active and reserve components, with the Base Force's numbers.<sup>23</sup>

The Air Force pursued a course of preserving as much of its modernization and acquisition accounts as possible. The Air Force leadership accepted the force structure reduction in compliance with the Base Force. The Air Force did internal analyses of force structure reductions so it could plan for the anticipated drawdown.<sup>24</sup>

These changes on DoD's structure created a great deal of tension with the services. Up until this point, the services held the preponderance of influence in defining and allocating what they viewed to be their resources. The services now had to take the guidance of OSD and CJCS

to generate different options. Those options had to satisfy the respective service's leadership, OSD, and had to be credible and justifiable to the CJCS and the joint staff.<sup>25</sup>

### A New Organizational Development

How has the evolution of interservice relationships affected the command structure and the employment of combatant forces? When Secretary Forrestal took the Joint Chiefs to Key West in March 1948 (seven months after passage of the National Security Act) the military departments were still the dominant players in what was then the National Military Establishment. The secretary of defense had little institutional stature, almost no staff, and only a rudimentary organizational plan for his office. The JCS were seen as representatives of service interests; and the joint staff was weak and beholden to individual JCS members. A new outline command plan was less than 15 months old and JCS did not as yet have a chairman.<sup>26</sup>

In contrast to Forrestal's situation in 1948, incremental changes have profoundly altered the balance of power among DoD components. Today the secretary of defense has all the authority and standing that law can provide, a large staff, and almost 50 years of operational and management precedents that have weakened the independence of the military departments and strengthened joint military components and perspectives. JCS is headed by a powerful CJCS recognized under law as the principal military advisor who controls the joint staff, oversees a vital system of unified commands, and exercises increasing influence over the allocation of resources.<sup>27</sup>

To a large extent the 1948-49 roles and missions debate was really a continuation of the 1946-47 debate over organization and post-war strategy. The roles and missions debate of the late 1940s, played out in bureaucratic struggles over the first DOD organizational directives, had much to do with contrasting perspectives of how the services would fight the Soviet Union. Each

service jockeyed for position as the Nation's primary force by arguing the wisdom and feasibility of strategic bombing and carrier air, and by wrestling for control (and debating impacts) of new technologies. Eventually, these volatile arguments came down to a programmatic competition and to a false choice between weapon systems; the Air Force B-36 bomber and the proposed Navy supercarrier.<sup>28</sup>

Strategy is an important issue today because the collapse of the Soviet Union has caused a rethinking of defense requirements despite the initiatives of the Base Force and Bottom-Up Review. Furthermore, the process for deciding strategy is more joint than ever and is no longer dominated by military departments. Likewise, the development of major new technologies and weapon systems has increasingly influenced the joint requirements and an acquisition process managed by OSD. Joint processes are emerging to develop strategic plans, define mission areas, identify essential tasks, and validate requirements. Thus, while there may be disagreement over the direction of a new military strategy, changes in structure and processes since 1948 leave little doubt that the secretary of defense and CJCS are responsible for deciding its content.

Moreover, if in 1948 the chain of logic (from strategy to roles and missions and programs) was from strategic bombing to long-range nuclear delivery and the B-36, there as yet appears to be a compelling analogy in 1997. Congress tasked the commission to establish such linkages if and where they seem warranted, but it is not clear that any simple alternatives have emerged to form the basis for radically new directions in strategy; especially since it is unlikely in today's environment that such alternatives would gain support if developed around limited, one dimensional, single-service capabilities. Cold War and post-cold war experience reveals the broad range of political-military circumstances and geographic locations to which the Nation may commit its forces in a variety of combinations. The strategic environment calls for flexibility,



and doctrine for force employment emphasizes jointness. As underscored in Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces:

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders choose the capabilities they need from the air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces at their disposal. The resulting team provides joint force commanders the ability to apply overwhelming force from different dimensions and directions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams to enemy action, while they rapidly and efficiently find and attack enemy weak points. Joint warfare is essential to victory.<sup>29</sup>

Changes in structure, process, and doctrine may explain why the definition of a mission as outlined in recent CJCS reports is a “task assigned to a combatant commander.” This is a departure from 1948 when missions were assigned to military departments which had responsibility for operations, and given a weak joint system, competed for dominance in making strategy. Such changes underscore the major importance of roles and functions; the balance among OSD, joint military components, and the military departments, and the need for careful attention in current debates. In fact, many contemporary issues can be accurately framed within context of this three-way relationship.

#### Aligning Responsibilities

How should responsibilities be divided between joint military components and the military departments? The legacy of World War II influenced and shaped the assignment of roles, missions, and functions among the armed forces of the United States. During that war, the United States fielded military forces of unprecedented size and scope. In the rush to assemble those ultimately victorious forces, little thought was given to the question of service roles and missions. The Executive Branch and Congress allocated resources and raised forces based on the simple principle that “whatever can be done should be done.” As the services expanded, some overlaps and duplications of effort developed between the Army and the Navy. This situation

was tolerable because the massive national mobilization, combined with the division of labor between mediums, mitigated the services parochial differences. The post-war budget cutting made resource allocation an issue of paramount importance so Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. Among its several provisions, the Act established the Air Force as a separate service and attempted to clarify service roles and missions to provide a framework for program and budget decisions. Some provisions specified in the act sparked immediate disagreement among the services, so Secretary of Defense James Forrestal convened a conference in Key West, Florida, where the service chiefs agreed on their respective roles and functions.<sup>30</sup>

Some argue that the Key West Agreement was flawed because it failed to resolve redundancy and duplication. In fact, what the chiefs recognized in 1947, and Congress has supported ever since, is that there are a number of advantages in having similar, complementary capabilities among the services. The availability of similar but specialized capabilities allows the combatant commander to tailor a military response to any contingency, regardless of geographic location. At the national command level, the existence of robust forces with complementary capabilities adds to the options available in a crisis, especially when the crisis is unexpected. Congress understood this when it passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act which requires the CJCS to submit a report not less than once every three years, recommending such changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and missions) that he considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces. The law specifies that in preparing such a report, the CJCS shall consider not duplication of effort, but only the unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces. Time and time again in this nation's history, the availability of similar but specialized capabilities has made all the difference.<sup>31</sup>

The coordinated performance of all the armed forces in Panama and in the Persian Gulf attests to the essential wisdom of the civilian and military leaders who forged the original Key West Agreement. The services' unrivaled ability to conduct joint and combined operations today is the logical conclusion of the process that began when Congress endeavored to unify the nation's armed forces and, as a result, established the DoD. The hope expressed at Key West fifty years ago, of unified armed forces operating efficiently and effectively without bickering or unproductive competition, has almost become reality. The progress of joint operations was exemplified in combat operations in the Gulf War when the Tiger Brigade of the Army's 2d Armored Division was placed under the 2d Marine Division, and its heavy tanks and self-propelled artillery provided an additional punch for the more lightly equipped Marines Corps. That kind of cooperation between two services makes the best of the capabilities of both, and results in a force greater than the sum of its parts. The vision of Key West was also evident in the humanitarian assistance operation to 30,000 Haitian refugees. What began as primarily a Marine Corps effort grew very quickly into a joint operation with a peak strength of more than 2,000 active duty and reserve troops from all services, including the Coast Guard. Although the preponderance of troops were Army, the joint task force was successfully commanded by a Marine Corps brigadier general. Another superb example was Operation EASTERN EXIT. When the American Embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia was threatened by rebel forces just as Operation DESERT STORM was about to break, options were needed for evacuating the embassy staff. Three days away, embarked on Navy amphibious ships, was a Marine Corps force with the capability to get in, get the people, and get out. If the situation deteriorated within those three days, Army Rangers in Air Force transports could have responded more quickly, but they would have had less firepower on the ground which would have made exit operations more difficult. As it happened, the Army Rangers were not needed and the embassy staff was rescued

by naval personnel. However, the complementary capabilities of the Marine Corps and Army gave the nation's leaders more than one option. As in so many other crisis situations, the nation was well served by the flexibility inherent in DoD's armed forces.<sup>32</sup>

Many long-standing problems are embedded in managing support functions common to all three services (medical, personnel, financial management, C<sup>2</sup>, base engineering, commissary, etc.). In these areas a basic tension exists between the responsibility of the secretary of defense for "effective, efficient, and economical administration" of DoD and intentional structure of "three military departments. . . separately organized." On issues of support or administration, OSD sees the military departments potentially doing business three different ways and thus seeks a better solution. As outlined in the conference report of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the law intends generally for the secretary of defense to have "sole and ultimate power within DoD on any matter on which the secretary chooses to act," giving him broad authority to reorganize DoD activities without changing statutory arrangements. Yet the practical problems of balancing the assignment of responsibilities among the DoD components must be addressed, involving careful distinctions among concepts such as policy review and oversight, management, management structure, resource allocation, administration, and program execution. These have been key problems in the reduction and streamlining of defense infrastructure.<sup>33</sup>

During the early 1990s, as common support functions were consolidated, in part through the Defense Management Review, the roles of OSD and military departments became subject to confusion in areas such as contract management, financial management, medical programs, and personnel management. As a result, the principle of maintaining authority and responsibility together with clear chains of command has been progressively and broadly compromised (a problem common in defense acquisition). Moreover, the result could be the consolidation of

support functions to the extent that combat and support forces would be separately administered in peacetime, and OSD controlled agencies would be primary providers of support in war.<sup>34</sup>

While the joint military structure (CJCS and combatant commanders) is responsible for preparing joint contingency plans, much of the competence and doctrinal expertise concerning employment of land, sea, and air forces is found in the three military departments. As joint agencies are strengthened, the question of appropriate divisions of labor will be more prominent. Likewise, the strengthened role of the CJCS in resource allocation raises the issue of how much of the programming and budgeting assets in the military departments and OSD should be duplicated by the joint staff or combatant commands. It is still not clear how the CJCS prerogative to develop alternative program and budget proposals will be exercised.

#### Aligning Roles and Functions

How should roles and functions be organized between the services, JCS, and the OSD to create a unified military service? Since both law and DoD directives intend that the JCS function as the “military staff” of the secretary of defense, he must apportion responsibilities between his staff and the JCS. The debate surrounding the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) under the direction of the vice CJCS is evidence that major issues are at stake concerning the balance of responsibilities between the military departments and JCS in developing requirements, programs, and budgets. Questions are raised on the respective roles of civilian and military staffs in providing advice on priorities to the secretary of defense, in particular on the role and function of the JROC versus other offices within OSD. While there is no doubt that the secretary of defense is responsible for strategy, policy, and the unified direction of DoD, the structure and process for making decisions about resource allocation deserves careful consideration from a roles and functions perspective.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to the above issues, which address the juncture of responsibilities among OSD, joint military components, and the military departments, there are unresolved issues within each of them. With respect to OSD and JCS, it can be argued that issues of internal functions and responsibilities should be handled at the discretion of their respective leaders. This is more difficult in the military departments since Title X provides for both military and civilian staffs within the same departmental headquarters. Goldwater-Nichols addressed some of these issues, but current and contrasting models for managing the departments reveal that there is unfinished business and that a further rationalization of civilian and military responsibilities would lead to greater efficiencies.<sup>36</sup>

The role of the military departments, especially their headquarters, basically depends upon how the secretary of defense perceives and exercises civilian control, how and to what extent he delegates authority to lesser OSD officials, and how far he goes in creating extensive defense-wide activities. Along these lines, service responsibilities may become narrow and the role of the secretary of defense and the OSD staff may become increasingly broad in nature. However, unbounded growth in OSD could eventually be recognized as detrimental for two reasons. First, the increasing tendency to move from program oversight to hands-on resource management highlights the limitations of the headquarters staffs as operating agents. Responsibility for resource management tends to turn advisors into advocates. Second, the functional orientation and growth of the OSD staff, reinforced by consolidation of defense agencies, have the effect of stovepiping management which then makes it more difficult for the secretary of defense to provide unified direction to DoD. Eventually, the deeply entrenched structure of decentralized technical services and bureaus which plagued the War and Navy Departments prior to World War II could resurface, this time led by under assistant secretaries of defense.<sup>37</sup>

The CORM highlighted the need to review the role of the OSD staff. Beyond acting as the immediate staff of the secretary of defense, its broader role is not addressed adequately by statute or in DoD Directive 5100.1 which outlines the major organizational functions. While retaining the flexibility to organize and operate DoD headquarters as the secretary of defense sees fit, further definition is necessary to articulate responsibilities of civilian and military staffs supporting the secretary of defense. Sorting out the future role of OSD is therefore central to various pending management issues, such as the unification of the armed forces, and crucial for the military departments.<sup>38</sup>

However, absorbing major portions of the military departments into a joint system has drawbacks. Responsibilities of the CJCS and joint components focus on joint military advice, warfighting, and joint force development and integration. Because these tasks are increasing complicated, adding the duties of organizing, training, equipping, maintaining, and supporting the entire armed forces would overwhelm any joint system and the span of control would be too broad. Additionally, service training, education, infrastructure, and the respective support systems, although overlapping and in the need of better coordination, are sufficiently large and dissimilar enough to justify separate and distinct administration. Therefore, it is not obvious that major efficiencies would result from placing the armed forces under a single joint management umbrella.<sup>39</sup>

Practical limits on the ability of OSD and joint structures to absorb all service functions may define an enduring place for the military departments by default. Moreover, it is not clear that better ways to organize, train, and equip forces can be developed. From a detached perspective, the world of eleven assistant secretaries supervising sixteen defense agencies, and the CJCS oversight of nine combatant commands, only accentuates the fact that the military departments are major integrating elements within the DoD organizational structure. They

internally balance and integrate combat, support, operations, and investment perspectives while composing differences, making tradeoffs, and executing decisions within a strong administrative chain of command. This argument leads to four separate service paths on any given issue and does not eliminate the need for defense-wide guidance from OSD and the joint structures. This shows that military departments, despite their narrow service perspectives, still have a broad enough view when it comes to balancing effectiveness and efficiency across a range of defense activities.<sup>40</sup>

However, particular functions are accomplished better or more efficiently if centralized in OSD or the joint system. Certainly this has been a leading rationale for the ongoing migration of support responsibilities away from the services. But this criterion is suboptimizing the overall structure of DoD. Each time a decision is made to consolidate three support activities, the span of control for the secretary of defense and the CJCS increases (sixteen defense agencies and nine combatant commands), and the synergism between combat and support activities is weakened, the responsibilities are split, and the organizational roles and functions are blurred. Moreover, this undervalues the overall advantage to DoD having three military departments provide the majority of management and administration for defense resources. This issue is not the power and influence of the military departments versus other DoD components because all power resides with the secretary of defense unless Congress prescribes otherwise. Furthermore, it is not an issue of traditional Title X responsibilities because most DoD components have at least some of their responsibilities outlined in that title. The issue is arriving at a clear understanding of the roles and functions of all components in relation to each other, given the tensions and ambiguities of Title X and the latitude of the secretary of defense to manage DoD.<sup>41</sup>

The expertise and core competencies of the military departments are in the professional knowledge of their respective warfighting environments, integration of combat and support



activities, balanced resource allocation that includes near-term and long-term perspectives, and the routine management and administration of the complex and large-scale peacetime activities. DoD needs the military departments to fulfill basic missions and it needs the professional expertise of the services to provide building blocks for a joint military capability. It also needs a balanced management perspective to assist the secretary of defense in efficient administration.<sup>42</sup>

Goldwater-Nichols was intended to build up joint structures too long dominated by the service interests, but it was not meant to eliminate the roles of the separate and distinct military departments. It may be time to recognize the importance of the separate services and not undo what has been accomplished or diminish the ongoing commitment to jointness, but rather ensure that jointness is grounded on a firm foundation of service force providers. This argues for revalidating and reinforcing the role of the military departments as primary line managers of defense resources and a preference for strong, effective, service secretaries and chiefs. Even with current budgetary and operational climates focused on greater efficiency and jointness, it remains important that the secretary of defense limits the responsibilities assigned to OSD and the joint structures, reaffirms the essential role of the military departments, and takes advantage of the fact that they are likely to remain a large and enduring feature of the defense organization.<sup>43</sup>

### Competing Views of Joint Operations

Notwithstanding the improvement in joint operations over the last decade, challenges confronting DoD today require a greater integration of service capabilities. An increasing number of technological and organizational challenges to warfighting, together with shrinking DoD resources, have forced a new visualization of national security and military strategies. Beneath joint military operations, there are two competing views of how forces should be used to increase combat effectiveness. One view argues in favor of using the best qualified force

component for a given mission which implies that overall combat effectiveness can be best enhanced by fitting forces to missions for which they are specialized. This view is called *specialization*. The other claims that higher combat effectiveness is made possible by combining forces in such a way that higher outputs result than could be achieved by simply adding the outputs of different forces. This view is called *synergism*. These views lead to differing operational behavior and force structures.<sup>44</sup>

Discussions of joint operations often refer to toolbox analogy which entails an admonition to consider all the forces available to a joint commander as if they were the contents of a toolbox. A JFC can pull the forces needed to do the job from the toolbox, regardless of whether the tools bear the markings of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps. The *specialization view* of joint operations would define the toolbox analogy as exactly right and would explain that a JFC turns to the box and chooses the right tool for the job. For example, if required to conduct a strategic bombardment campaign, the JFC would assign the missions to the force component that knows the most about strategic bombardment; perhaps the Air Force. The *synergistic view* would also say the toolbox was correct and that a JFC would put together the right tool out of various force components. The strategic bombardment mission would utilize the air assets available from all the services and combined in the most productive way by a JFC.

The operational implications of these two views vary as the use of force is concerned. The essence of *specialization* is to clearly differentiate combat responsibilities along force specialty lines and break out missions by service components while that of *synergism* is almost the opposite with respect to mission assignments. *Specialization* takes advantage of inherent efficiencies in the integrated traditions, doctrines, discipline and procedures of a single service; while *synergism* blends particular service strengths on a mission basis to provide higher combat output than either single service or the sum of individual service contributions could produce.

Neither view has as yet prevailed, though both have legitimate claims on DoD's understanding of jointness.<sup>45</sup>

Since 1990 the efforts of the armed forces have evolved from *specialized* to slightly less than *synergistic* joint warfare. DESERT STORM represents *specialized* joint warfare in that the armed forces employed an impressive array of multiservice, multidimensional, multifaceted, and multifunctional forces with the common objective of ousting Iraq from Kuwait. The armed forces had the luxury of powerful, massed, deeply redundant, separate services fighting in the same battlespace. Service capabilities were deconflicted rather than integrated. Although these *specialized* joint operations improved multiservice operations as a result of Goldwater-Nichols, DoD can no longer afford the inefficiencies of a system that brings redundant forces together for the first time on the battlefield.<sup>46</sup>

Joint operations since DESERT STORM, such as RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, and JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia, have somewhat approached the level of *synergistic* joint operations. These operations were mutually supporting in that JFCs orchestrated separate service capabilities for their common tactical objectives. Yet the lack of common joint doctrine has prevented the armed forces from reaching the total *synergistic* joint level.<sup>47</sup>

To achieve the *synergistic* level of joint operations, General Shalikashvili's vision for how the military will channel resources and leverage technology for greater joint effectiveness rests on the armed forces being able to conduct coherent joint operations. JFCs must be able to integrate service capabilities to achieve common tactical and operational objectives. Likewise, these integrated joint forces must accommodate the natural battle rhythms and cycles of land, sea, and air warfare.<sup>48</sup>

### A Comparison to the Unified Canadian Forces

After World War II, the Canadian military experienced similar problems to that of the United States. Their military was forced to decline in size and the public did not want large amounts of funds spent on national defense. Canada's defense spending peaked in the early 1950s and by 1962, the high cost of weapons, combined with new demands on the federal government to allocate more funds to social programs, compelled a reevaluation of the national defense policy. In the next few years, the headquarters of the separate services were integrated under a single Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS), and eventually a National Defense Headquarters (NDHQ) emerged, combining the military and civilian leadership. In 1968, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian Air Force, and the Canadian Army were abolished and unified into a single entity known as the Canadian Forces (CF). The CF were divided along environmental or functional lines with a single rank structure and were made to wear the same uniform. This led to the origin of the Mobile Command, the Maritime Command, and the Air Command.<sup>49</sup>

The Canadian government gave several reasons for implementing unification. There was the economic factor; given the combined costs of maintaining modern armed forces and expanding domestic social problems, savings had to be made in the operation of the military. Furthermore, Canada could not afford three separate service organizations. While these fiscal constraints were the major concern, the flexible response ideas, put forth by former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, were used to justify unification. The Department of National Defense (DND) contended that the new organization would make the CF highly mobile and flexible, capable of combining air, sea, and ground forces. From the military standpoint, the government also argued that Canada needed flexible, mobile forces that integrated air and land units capable of quick deployment to Europe or to fulfill peacekeeping obligations. Unification would also allow for a general reduction in personnel, freeing up funds for capital improvements

and the purchase of new equipment. Overall, military and economic efficiency would be improved by dividing the forces along functional lines rather than the formal lines of the traditional service divisions.<sup>50</sup>

Even though unification proceeded as planned, the savings promised were largely consumed by inflation, thereby reducing the amount of new equipment that could be purchased. Under the newly established Mobile command, Canada created a force dedicated to rapid movement overseas. However, since these forces were to be integrated with allied forces that were not unified, Canada continued to offer separate and discrete air, land, and naval units. Because of this, the armed forces never really stopped operating as an air force, an army, and a navy, although they were formally abolished along with their distinctive uniforms and rankings. Eventually, Maritime Command, Air Command, and Land Forces Command replaced the older services and since 1980, more frequent mention has been made to the separate services and their distinctive uniforms returned.<sup>51</sup>

The end of the Cold War and diminishing resources were common to every military establishment. Canada, although more belatedly than some of its allies, determined that jointness was the way of the future. This reflected a determination to get more bang for the buck as well as recognition that operational needs required much closer links among differing warfare environments. In formulating doctrine for planning and conducting joint operations, Canada had unashamedly drawn on the experiences and practices of its allies, the United States and the United Kingdom in particular, by adapting ideas where appropriate to its own much smaller forces with their unique needs and concerns.

Canadian doctrine for conducting joint operations is evolving, a process that is likely to continue indefinitely, and is contained in a publication known as the *Keystone Manual*. An entire family of publications dealing with different facets of joint operations is derived from this

manual, many of which are still under development. This hierarchy of doctrine closely mirrors the system of joint publications in the US Armed Forces. Prominent in this doctrine are the familiar terms to all: principles of war, operational level of war, command and control, et al.<sup>52</sup>

Together with its allies, Canada foresees that joint operations will be controlled by a JFC and his staff, but that deployed forces will be contributed by the three existing environmental commands. Forces will be controlled by their respective component commanders or, in smaller operations, by the JFC. Supporting elements such as communications, logistics, and medical units are provided in unified form, although the individual members wear army, navy, or air force uniforms. The joint headquarters can operate as a Canadian national headquarters, with the responsibility for a sector or task. All operations are directed on the strategic level by the Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff (DCDS) who, obviously, is responsible to the Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS). DCDS acts as the chief operations officer, assisted by the Chief of Staff (COS) J-3 and a permanent joint operations staff at the NDHQ. The J-3 issues operational orders to meet programmed and emergency requirements. The staff is responsible for planning, conducting, and coordinating joint operations on the strategic level and provides the JFC with a single point of contact at the NDHQ. Command on the strategic level is maintained by the CDS while his other subordinates, who are not in the operational chain of command, advise him and provide forces which are ready to be deployed.<sup>53</sup>

Key to the Canadian concept of jointness is the joint operations planning process (JOPP). This is routinely employed in exercises and real world operations. JOPP utilizes pre-existing contingency operation plans, thus reducing the reliance on ad hoc planning in a contingency. Plans provide for establishing joint headquarters and deploying front line forces and supporting elements. Canadian planning is generally capability-based, working with force levels that

realistically might be available. This represents somewhat of a shift from the Cold War when commitment-based planning was the norm.<sup>54</sup>

In sum, the development of Canadian doctrine for planning joint operations on the strategic level is well advanced. On the operational level staffs are fast gaining knowledge and experience and on the tactical level, Canada has not yet developed doctrine and procedures that enables forces from different environments to operate together. However, jointness is alive and well and is fast maturing in Canada.

### Summary

The Goldwater-Nichols Act focused on joint military structures where significant organizational deficiencies had existed for more than four decades. However, weaknesses exist on the administrative side of DoD which have been magnified by post-cold war security challenges. Attempts to reduce duplication between service secretariats and service staffs by separating civilian and military functions and by assigning certain responsibilities to the secretary of defense have only partially succeeded. Today, we are freer to think in terms of shaping the future, although, we must also face the issue of the political purpose of military force. It is no longer simply a matter of thinking it through enough to counter successfully a defined military threat; we must design military forces more specifically in terms of their political purposes. We must rebuild an intellectual framework that links our forces to our policy.

Never before have armies been challenged to assimilate the combined weight of so much change so rapidly. In this environment, the payoff will go to organizations which are versatile, flexible, and strategically agile, and to leaders who are bold, creative, innovative, and inventive. Conversely, there is enormous risk in hesitation, undue precision, and a quest for certainty.<sup>55</sup>

General Gordon R. Sullivan's observation applies to the US Armed Forces. This former US Army Chief of Staff had the admonition to seize the initiative and to push for innovation and

creativity. These changing times require changes to planning processes, management and direction functions, and organizational command structures that were built for an era that has passed.

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<sup>1</sup>Sam Nunn, "Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services Roles and Missions," *Vital Speeches of the Day* (August 1992): 620.

<sup>2</sup>David C. Jones, General, United States Air Force (Retired), "Past Organizational Problems," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 24.

<sup>3</sup>Richard L. West, Lieutenant General, United States Army (Retired), *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Its Impact on the Army* (Arlington, AUSA, 1988), 7.

<sup>4</sup>*Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* (Washington: U.S. Government, October 1986).

<sup>5</sup>Richard L. West, Lieutenant General, United States Army (Retired), *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Its Impact on the Army* (Arlington, AUSA, 1988), 6.

<sup>6</sup>*The National Security Act of 1947* (Washington: U.S. Government, July 1947).

<sup>7</sup>David C. Jones, General, United States Air Force (Retired), "Past Organizational Problems," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 23.

<sup>8</sup>*Department of Defense Directive 5100.1* (Washington: U.S. Government, March 1954).

<sup>9</sup>*Department of Defense Directive 5100.1* (Washington: U.S. Government, March 1954).

<sup>10</sup>*Department of Defense Directive 5100.1* (Washington: U.S. Government, March 1954).

<sup>11</sup>David C. Jones, General, United States Air Force (Retired), "Past Organizational Problems," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 24.

<sup>12</sup>*The National Security Act of 1947* (Washington: U.S. Government, July 1947).

<sup>13</sup>Colin L. Powell, General, United States Army, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington: National Defense University Press, February 1993), xi.

<sup>14</sup>*The National Security Act of 1947* (Washington: U.S. Government, July 1947).



<sup>15</sup>Richard L. West, Lieutenant General, United States Army (Retired), *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Its Impact on the Army* (Arlington, AUSA, 1988), 6.

<sup>16</sup>John Keegan, *World Armies*, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 616.

<sup>17</sup>John Keegan, *World Armies*, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 617.

<sup>18</sup>John Keegan, *World Armies*, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 619.

<sup>19</sup>*Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1995).

<sup>20</sup>Stuart E. Johnson, "The Bottom Up Review," *Joint Force Quarterly* 3 (Winter 1993-94): 105.

<sup>21</sup>Colin L. Powell, General, United States Army, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington: National Defense University Press, February 1993), II-2.

<sup>22</sup>Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 38.

<sup>23</sup>Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 40.

<sup>24</sup>Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 41.

<sup>25</sup>Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 45.

<sup>26</sup>Carl H. Builder, "Roles and Missions: Back to the Future," *Joint Force Quarterly* 4 (Spring 1994): 32.

<sup>27</sup>Carl H. Builder, "Roles and Missions: Back to the Future," *Joint Force Quarterly* 4 (Spring 1994): 33.

<sup>28</sup>Carl H. Builder, "Roles and Missions: Back to the Future," *Joint Force Quarterly* 4 (Spring 1994): 33.

<sup>29</sup>*Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington: U.S. Government, January 1995).

<sup>30</sup>Carl H. Builder, "Roles and Missions: Back to the Future," *Joint Force Quarterly* 4 (Spring 1994): 32.

<sup>31</sup>*Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* (Washington: U.S. Government, October 1986).

<sup>32</sup>Colin L. Powell, General, United States Army, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington: National Defense University Press, February 1993), 1-6.

<sup>33</sup>*Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* (Washington: U.S. Government, October 1986).

<sup>34</sup>Carl H. Builder, "Roles and Missions: Back to the Future," *Joint Force Quarterly* 4 (Spring 1994): 37.

<sup>35</sup>*Department of Defense Directive 5100.1* (Washington: U.S. Government, March 1954).

<sup>36</sup>*Department of Defense Directive 5100.1* (Washington: U.S. Government, March 1954).

<sup>37</sup>Colin L. Powell, General, United States Army, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington: National Defense University Press, February 1993), 1-2.

<sup>38</sup>*Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1995).

<sup>39</sup>Carl H. Builder, "Roles and Missions: Back to the Future," *Joint Force Quarterly* 4 (Spring 1994): 37.

<sup>40</sup>*Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1995).

<sup>41</sup>*Department of Defense Directive 5100.1* (Washington: U.S. Government, March 1954).

<sup>42</sup>*Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1995).

<sup>43</sup>*Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* (Washington: U.S. Government, October 1986).

<sup>44</sup>John J. Sheehan, General, United States Marine Corps, "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 42.

<sup>45</sup>John J. Sheehan, General, United States Marine Corps, "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 42.

<sup>46</sup>John J. Sheehan, General, United States Marine Corps, "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 42.

<sup>47</sup>John J. Sheehan, General, United States Marine Corps, "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 42.

<sup>48</sup>John J. Sheehan, General, United States Marine Corps, "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 42.

<sup>49</sup>John Keegan, *World Armies*, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 93.

<sup>50</sup>John Keegan, *World Armies*, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 94.

<sup>51</sup>John Keegan, *World Armies*, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 94.

<sup>52</sup>John Keegan, *World Armies*, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 96.

<sup>53</sup>John Keegan, *World Armies*, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 96.

<sup>54</sup>John Keegan, *World Armies*, (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 96.

<sup>55</sup>William A. Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 121 (May 1995): 36.

## CHAPTER 3

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be even more imperative tomorrow. Joint Vision 2010 provides an operationally based template for the evolution of the armed forces for a challenging and uncertain future. It must become a benchmark for service and unified commands visions.<sup>1</sup>

CJCS John M. Shalikashvili, 1996

It is desirable to consolidate the military armed forces into a unified joint military service, is not a valid hypothesis. Effective joint operations consists of blending the distinct colors of the armed forces into a rainbow of synergistic military effectiveness. It does not suggest pouring them into a single jar and mixing them until they lose their individual properties to come out as a colorless paste. Balanced military judgment and combat effectiveness depends on service individuality, culture, training, and interpretation of the battlefield. The essence of jointness is the flexible blending of service individualities. Therefore it is not desirable to unify the armed forces into a single military service.

For a comparison, Canada opted for a single armed force in the place of individual services. This project held the prospect of increased flexibility, lower manpower requirements, and a greater portion of the defense budget being available for capital expenditure. Functional commands were created and a series of reorganizations and changes followed this unification. However, the impact of inflation, rising costs of military hardware, and increasing operating costs cut severely into the portion of the defense budget available for capital expenditure. Although

these difficulties and unfulfilled promises still led to some improvements employed by the Canadian government, the unified Canadian Forces never really stopped operating as separate and distinct services. They remained separate under a joint umbrella.

Since the National Security Act of 1947 unified the defense establishment, numerous secretaries of defense have struggled to assign roles, missions, and functions among the major DoD components, including the JCS, the armed services, and the unified commands. Once responsibilities were actually assigned, securing the performance of them proved an even greater challenge because of service parochial issues and the various components exertion of undue influence on DoD. Successive secretaries found that they lacked authority to force compliance. Other senior leaders, such as the CJCS and the combatant commanders, also found that they lacked the means to carry out their responsibilities. Weaknesses in central civilian authority as well as military authority coupled with ambiguities in the original law promoted severe interservice competition in both military operations and resource allocation.

When the JCS met at Key West in 1948, roles, missions, and functions all meant the same thing. The differentiation in terms that were offered in chapter one and two evolved only as DoD matured. In 1948, there was no need to differentiate among roles, missions, and functions, because whatever those terms meant, the services did them all. The service chiefs, serving as the JCS, were responsible for establishing combatant commands and deciding which service would be the executive agent for each command. Orders were transmitted to each combatant commander by a service chief.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed these issues by defining the responsibilities and the authority to perform them. Empowered by these reforms, DoD has made great strides in preparing for joint operations. Among its major accomplishments, the Goldwater-Nichols Act distinguished between the operational contributions of the services and the unified commands.

That distinction provided a sound basis for effective and efficient joint operations by assigning the specific responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping forces to the services, while delegating the planning and execution of those operations to the unified commands. This sharp division of responsibilities among the services, the unified commands, and other DoD components eliminated many of the previous ambiguities. As a result of experience, including lessons learned in military operations around the world, and as a result of executive and legislative branch initiatives, today's current organization links the roles and responsibilities of combatant commands directly to the secretary of defense and the president for the missions assigned to them. Fundamentally, it is a mistake to take the traditional approach of "who gets what" in terms of roles and missions that concentrates on the armed services. The emphasis should be "who needs what" in terms of joint military capabilities. From this perspective, the services are properly aligned and focused on the right set of roles and functions. Each service is fully engaged in trying to deliver to the combatant commanders the best possible set of specific air, land, and sea capabilities. Viewed from this perspective, some perceived roles and missions problems are not problems at all. The analysis of the core competencies, assignment of functions, and the needs of the unified combatant commanders found that popular perceptions of large scale duplication among the services are incorrect. Putting the old "who gets what" argument into the proper perspective is an essential step toward focusing on joint military capabilities.

Orchestrating land, sea, and air operations in joint warfare is demanding and contentious at times but technology has provided some of the tools needed for efficient and effective joint operations. Technological advances have afforded the armed forces with the best military systems and have expanded service capabilities in an exponential manner. Forces in one medium are able to influence events in another. The services engage in intramural competition in meeting

this responsibility; but competition can be healthy in looking for alternative technological solutions. As the CORM concluded in its report, “Service competition has delivered innovative systems and technologies. The key is to manage such competition to assure that it is not wasteful.”<sup>22</sup> However, many contemporary issues regarding the relationship of the armed services to the advancement of technology have been debated for over half a century and these ruthless debates have erupted over which military service should dominate the military establishment. While the international security environment may be new, the debate on roles, missions, and functions—who does what within the military establishment—is not. This debate began long before the 1947 National Security Act’s creation of the defense department. In fact, this debate is about how best to mold America’s air, land, and sea forces into a unified combat team that makes the best use of each service’s particular strengths today and for the future.

Before Goldwater-Nichols, the services dominated DoD activities with their continuing negotiations over roles, missions, functions, and heavily influenced planning and operational decisions. The perspective of the CJCS and the ideas, needs, and plans of the combatant commanders were not included in major operational decisions. Furthermore, the forceful exercise of institutional service roles, based on their individual areas of responsibility, diluted the combatant commanders plans for theater-wide joint operations. Consequently, joint operations did not materialize and the combatant commanders were unable to influence service plans, especially in the case of modernization or force development, although these same combatant commanders were expected to fight and win with the forces provided to them by the services.

By ensuring that the combatant commanders had the authority to prepare for and conduct joint military operations, Goldwater-Nichols fundamentally changed the way in which DoD functioned. The law increased the authority of the combatant commanders over planning, developing, training, and deploying forces for joint operations. Additionally, the CJCS assumed

greater prominence as the channel for combatant commander influence over these activities. With the CJCS reporting to the secretary of defense and directing an effective staff, a major reallocation of responsibilities occurred. Nonetheless, the law defined and enhanced the value of the services by focusing them on core competencies which involved delivering combat capabilities to the combatant commanders. By strengthening and emphasizing core competencies, Goldwater-Nichols enhanced the capability of each service to support the combatant commanders in their warfighting role.

The services remain the bedrock of military capabilities. Their unique competencies serve as the foundation that enables joint warfighting. Differing perspectives, framed by expertise in certain technologies and ways of warfare, are essential to joint operational success. The challenge, answered by Goldwater-Nichols, was to orient the services toward those roles which grow out of their institutional strengths, supporting joint operations today while assuring the availability of effective joint operational forces for the future. DoD's future success, and America's future security, depends on building the forces needed for an uncertain and changing world. Congress understands that changes are required in the allocation of roles and missions to ensure the nation will have properly prepared military forces for the challenges ahead. Effective utilization of the military power of this Nation requires that the efforts of the separate military services be closely integrated. Unity of effort among the services at the national level is obtained by the authority of the president and the secretary of defense which is exercised through the secretaries of the military departments and the CJCS, by defining the responsibilities of the military services through assignment of combatant functions, by strategic planning and direction of the JCS, and by common, joint, and cross-servicing by the military departments. Unity of effort among the armed forces assigned to unified commands is achieved by practice and performance of the combatant command, by adherence to common strategic plans and directives,



by adherence to reconciled joint doctrine, and by an operational and administrative command organization based on service functions. The key to unity of effort is the assignment of responsibility. The armed forces are organized trained, and equipped to perform specific combatant functions which Congress has defined by law. These common combatant functions of the armed forces are defined as follows:

1. To prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and military operations other than war and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war.
2. To maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in an emergency.
3. To provide adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence and counterintelligence for the military departments and other agencies as directed by competent authority.
4. To recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to combatant commands and to prepare and submit mobilization information to the JCS.
5. To prepare and submit programs and budgets for their respective departments; justify before Congress budget requests as approved by the president; and administer the funds made available for maintaining, equipping, and training the forces of their respective departments, including those assigned to combatant commands.
6. To conduct research; develop tactics, techniques, and organization; and develop and procure weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of the functions assigned by Chapter 6, Title X, US Code and by the DoD Directive 5100.1.
7. To develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations, including lines of communication, and to provide administrative and logistical support for all forces and bases, unless otherwise directed by the secretary of defense.
8. To provide, as directed, such forces, military missions, and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national interest of the US.
9. To assist in training and equipping the military forces of foreign nations.
10. To provide, as directed, administrative and logistical support to the headquarters of combatant commands, to include direct support of the development and acquisition of the command and control system of such headquarters.
11. To assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions, including the provisions of personnel, intelligence, training, facilities, equipment, supplies, and services.<sup>3</sup>

These combatant functions provide the organizational division of responsibility within DoD for developing military capabilities and are fundamental both to force development and employment. Additionally, Congress has established safeguards regarding transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition of combatant functions assigned by law. The statutory

basis for the combatant functions assigned the military services within DoD is the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and codified in Title X of the US Code. These statutory foundations are as follows:

1. In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.<sup>4</sup>

2. In general, the Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war, except as otherwise assigned, and is generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. The Navy is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.<sup>5</sup>

3. In general, the Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three aircraft wings, and other such land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.<sup>6</sup>

4. In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces not otherwise assigned to the other services. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air combat operations. It is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.<sup>7</sup>

In their totality, these functions provide considerable flexibility for employment of forces by assignment of primary and collateral responsibilities and limits the duplication of force capabilities among the services by allowing the development of force structure for primary missions. Within this construct, the defined roles and missions of the respective services are

most explicit. Each of the military service has the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to fulfill their assigned combatant functions and for administering and supporting such forces. This responsibility includes the formulation of tactical and technical doctrine for the combatant functions involved, the internal structure and composition of forces, the type of training to be given, and the types and quantities of equipment and supplies to be developed and procured. This undivided responsibility in a single military service, consisting of the preparation of forces for a joint field of warfare, ensures that US combat forces and provisions for their support can be utilized and integrated effectively within the various combatant commands. Therefore, the military services can assign forces, as directed, to the combatant commands to perform the joint missions of those commands.

America's Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are the best trained, best equipped, and most capable military force the world has ever known. The men and women who serve today are better educated, better trained, and more skilled than ever before. No other military force in the world could have terminated the Cold War, deployed halfway around the world to lead an allied coalition to victory in the Gulf War, and then gone on to execute peacekeeping and humanitarian operations that span the globe. They have enforced restrictions on military action in Iraq, delivered food and medical supplies in Somalia and Rwanda, helped their fellow citizens fight forest fires and recover from earthquakes and floods, and restored order in Haiti. However, the termination of the Cold War has changed the international environment just as surely as did the tremendous victory in World War II. The Cold War strategy, dominated by the importance of containing communism, established nuclear and conventional deterrence as the primary role of US Armed Forces. DoD emphasized aspects of military power most useful for those purposes: instantaneous readiness of nuclear bombers, combined with land and sea based missile forces; large-scaled, forward-deployed forces in Europe and Northeast Asia with reinforcements ready to

deploy from CONUS. While other risks were also considered, the Soviet threat dominated America's planning, preparation, and funding.

Today's national security challenge is considerably different. There is no longer a single dominant enemy. While the US is still charged with providing capabilities to fight two major regional conflicts, its attention is increasingly drawn to smaller contingencies. The national security strategy evolved to reflect these world changes. Instead of focusing on containment and deterrence, the National Security Strategy now emphasizes promoting democracy and economic advancement worldwide. The military component of this strategy supports creating and maintaining the stability required to allow democracy and economic growth to flourish while staying ready to protect the US interests and those of its allies and friends on short notice.

The services are responsible for providing the military capabilities essential to fighting and winning this Nation's wars. They develop tactical concepts; manage research and development; acquire weapons and supporting systems; recruit, educate, and train personnel; develop leaders; and organize, train, and equip the specific forces that combatant commanders need to accomplish their assigned missions. The combatant commanders are responsible for conducting these wars and employing unified military forces in pursuit of the national security objectives. They can fulfill this responsibility only if the services and other supporting organizations can provide the capabilities needed for success.

All future military operations will call on the capabilities of the services along with support from the defense agencies, other governmental agencies, and non-governmental organizations. These military operations are planned and conducted by joint forces under the direction of the combatant commanders. Pulling these capabilities together for complex, dangerous joint unified military operations is the responsibility of the combatant commanders. They form their effective unified forces from the diverse array of capabilities provided to them

by the services and other supporting organizations. Effective and efficient joint operations are essential when one strategic task requires the coordinated employment of continental and maritime operations. Moreover, Army and Air Force roles and missions generally require that any continental undertaking be joint in nature. Joint operations may be required for certain military capabilities where no one service is self-sufficient. Additionally, joint operations can be used as a way of augmenting a service component with a specific function for a specified period; in this employment, joint operations avoid redundant force development among the services.

However, there are limits to the utility of joint operations and it generally decreases with the size of the force to be employed and the time available to prepare for operations. Where possible, the combatant commander should make use of existing service core competencies; as a general rule, a joint force should not be formed when one of the components is capable of meeting the task. Patching together an ad hoc force essentially cancels out the standing operating procedures, training, communications, and logistic arrangements available in a permanently constituted single service. Simplicity, as a principle of war, is applicable to the organization of forces as well as their employment.

The primary options for organizational structure are area orientation, functional orientation, or a combination of the two. Moreover, service logistic responsibilities and combatant functions dictate that service components are the building blocks for joint organizations, whether in an area or functional format. The functions involved in a military operation determine the service identity of the forces to be assigned and usually the service identity of the overall commander. While the combatant functions of the military services are not intended to be rigidly prescriptive with respect to the command structure or relationship, due consideration must be given to these service functions. The joint command organization integrates components of two or more services into efficient teams while, at the same time,

preserving the single service responsibilities and organizational integrity in order to exploit their inherent capabilities. There is no one organizational formula which is adequate for every strategic, logistic, tactical, and political situation. The only constant factor in joint organization is variation, not only among separate operations but also from phase to phase within campaigns. It is not desirable to consolidate the military armed forces into a unified military service under these circumstances.

Notwithstanding, the success of the military in the Persian Gulf was in part the result of effective and somewhat efficient joint operations. Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated that the military capabilities developed separately by each of the services are individually superb. However, they did not prove to work well enough together. In the absence of a single joint vision to guide their efforts, each service develops capabilities and trains its forces according to its own vision of how its forces should contribute to joint warfighting. Not surprisingly, the services' ideas about how to integrate all forces reflect their own perspectives, typically giving the other services a role supporting their main effort.

Each service's vision informs and guides its internal decisions on systems acquisition, doctrine, training, organization, management of forces, and the conduct of operations. The Army's description of "Force XXI," the Navy's "Forward . . . From the Sea," the Marine Corps' "Operational Maneuver . . . From the Sea," and the Air Force's "Global Reach, Global Power" are valuable vision statements of how each service views its role. Moreover, these service visions help form a joint vision, but collectively they cannot replace it. Competing elements exist in these visions that must be reconciled. They are also incomplete. There is no joint command and control or joint logistics. The service visions do not explain collectively how a joint force commander can integrate service capabilities to achieve the most effective mix for specific warfighting purposes. However, competition among warfighting visions is a strength. Indeed,

this is among the principal benefits of the uniquely organized DoD. The variety of service perspectives adds breadth, flexibility, and synergy to military operations. Nevertheless, integrating their warfighting concepts must receive more emphasis. Otherwise, the services can only work to develop the capabilities they need to fulfill their own particular visions. There is a pressing need for a central vision to harmonize the services' views. This vision should drive joint requirements and serve as a basis for elevating the importance of joint operations as an essential core competency of all joint commands and agencies. Hopefully, the joint team concept of *Joint Vision 2010*, as depicted by the CJCS John M. Shalikashvili in the beginning of this chapter, will enable the armed forces to operate effectively and efficiently in a joint environment.

### Recommendations

Organizational effectiveness depends on a clear understanding of the responsibilities assigned to various components and of the relationships intended among those components. This is especially true in organizations as large and complex as DoD. While joint commands and staffs have been strengthened by Goldwater-Nichols to better support the CJCS and the combatant commanders, similar improvements have not taken place in OSD. The consequent mismatch needs to be corrected by improving OSD's effectiveness. The relationship between the Joint Staff and OSD remains inadequately defined and too dependent on informal contacts. Their respective roles in shaping a unified vision for DoD, coordinating solutions to complex political and military problems, and supporting streamlined management processes must be clarified.

There are several key steps that may improve the joint approach to warfighting. First, there must be continued initiatives in the area of joint doctrine. Joint doctrine is very complex but it provides the procedures and teamwork necessary to win America's wars. Second, efforts to streamline doctrine development must be renewed. A responsive system would instill confidence

and strengthen resolve to make it work. The process is somewhat slow, but a dedicated and concentrated effort would decrease the time it takes to publish joint material. Third, the issue of parochialism must be addressed. Service perspectives are essential, but parochialism must not be allowed. Joint doctrine, coupled with the roles, missions, and functions of the services, must quickly identify common ground that is found within the framework of the services toward a particular goal. That commonality must then be exploited to ensure the practice of efficient and effective joint operations. Fourth, joint publications should be written by joint organizations. The biggest shortcoming in the current development of joint doctrine is the "lead agent" concept. The practice of designating one service to act as the lead agent for the overarching doctrine that broadly guides all service activities; such as Joint Pub 3-0, *Joint Operations*, for which the Army took the lead; can produce widely differing interpretations and confusion. Disagreements over the specifics of doctrine are compounded by deeper differences among the services. They define and use doctrine differently. Even with the best intentions, the first draft invariably favors the lead agent's service. A better idea is to have ACOM bring together subject matter experts from the individual services and other doctrine centers to develop the publication. Written from a joint perspective, the document would identify the common ground and provide a basis for an agreement on joint doctrine and joint operations. Finally, obstacles to new ways of looking at joint issues must be removed. For example, it may be time to form a joint command at a unit below battalion level. The services form, fund, and operate forces at the unit level. A test program under a joint command structure at unit level may provide a vehicle to test new, innovative, and sometimes unpredictable approaches to joint operations. The goal of joint unified operations is to combine the strengths of all the services to achieve success in combat. The world has changed and the armed forces now operate in a very different geopolitical and operational



environment than they did five years ago with more change being inevitable. The foundation of a more effective joint system will allow the armed forces to be ready for whatever may occur.

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<sup>1</sup>John M. Shalikashvili, General, United States Army, "Joint Vision 2010," *A Common Perspective* (October 1996).

<sup>2</sup>*Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington: U.S. Government, January 1995), II-13.

<sup>3</sup>U.S. Marine Corps, *FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense* (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1991), 3-1.

<sup>4</sup>U.S. Marine Corps, *FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense* (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1991), 3-2.

<sup>5</sup>U.S. Marine Corps, *FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense* (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1991), 3-3.

<sup>6</sup>U.S. Marine Corps, *FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense* (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1991), 3-2.

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
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
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